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1.1. Motivation 
Free is a very intriguing concept that is of importance in many different situa-
tions: The entrance to a museum may be free, consumers may receive a free 
guarantee, or public transport may be offered for free. The fact that a certain 
service or product is offered at no cost makes the offer particularly interesting 
by suggesting that ‘normally’ a price had to be charged. Yet, can the desired and 
wished for responses ever be accomplished by giving out free things? What 
motivates individuals and firms to provide certain offers at no cost? 
 Gift giving is common practice in our society. However, its rules are mani-
fold and depend strongly on the specific situations. If you unwrap your part-
ner’s present and find 100 Euros, you will be disappointed, because you rather 
expected a present with some symbolic meaning. Gift giving among partners is 
thus subject to the social exchange model, in which gifts have a symbolic mean-
ing and are meant to build up social bonding such that reciprocity is not ex-
pected to take place immediately (Belk and Coon 1993). In other situations, the 
economic exchange model applies (Belk and Coon 1993). If a neighbor invites 
you for dinner, you will invite her for dinner at your house in response and take 
care that you put comparable effort in preparing the meal. In the economic 
exchange model gifts are valued based on economic attributes and immediately 
reciprocated with gifts of comparable monetary value to avoid dependence 
among the parties. Thus, the relationship among the parties involved deter-
mines the motivation of giving a gift, how a gift should be selected, and the ex-
pectations of the giver and receiver. Apart from situations of individual gift 
giving, free affects consumers’ mindsets and behavior in many more circum-
stances. 
 Academic research on compensation and rewards also studies the role of 
free. In general, rewards, which are provided closely after a certain behavior, 
increase the chance of reoccurrence of this behavior (Deci, Koestner, and Ryan 
1999). However, if an individual is intrinsically motivated to perform an activi-
ty, a reward is counterproductive, because extrinsic rewards may undermine 
intrinsic motivation and decrease performance (Deci et al. 1999; Gneezy and 
Rustichini 2000b). Gneezy and Rustichini (2000a) illustrate that introducing a 
fine for late coming parents increased the number of parents that came late to 
pick up their children (Gneezy and Rustichini 2000a). As long as parents did not 
have to pay a fine, they considered the service of the teacher to stay with their 
children as goodwill and tried to avoid being late. However, as soon as a fine 
was introduced, the teacher’s behavior of staying with the children was per-
ceived as a service parents pay for if needed. Heyman and Ariely (2004) argue 
that the character of a compensation determines whether consumers think in 
terms of monetary or social markets. If individuals receive a monetary compen-
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sation, they think in terms of market norms and according to reciprocation 
motives. Their performance is sensitive to the level of monetary rewards. How-
ever, if there is no or some non-monetary incentive, individuals behave in line 
with social norms, which are based on altruistic motives.  
 In product markets, zero price leads to surprising effects (Shampanier, 
Mazar, and Ariely 2007). Shampanier et al. (2007) report that consumers 
choose a product significantly more often, if it is offered for free than if it is 
offered at some cost. The findings provide empirical evidence that affect acts as 
a decisional cue and steers consumers’ choices for the free product. Offering a 
product for free affects consumers’ cost-benefit analysis. Instead of solely de-
creasing costs, free adds to the benefits and increases the product’s attractive-
ness. Social norms have also been found to be at play in that they influence the 
amount of free products taken by a consumer. The majority merely takes one 
unit, if it is free, but takes multiple units when paying some positive price.  
 Free influences consumers’ mindsets and behavior in that it determines a 
consumer’s situational evaluation routines. Consumers’ seem to perceive a free 
offer as a gift and evaluate the situation as a social exchange rather than a mar-
ket exchange. However, even in gift giving among acquaintances reciprocity and 
monetary equality play a role. This triggers the question, what the effects of 
free offers as an incentive to promote products and services will be? Particular-
ly, how do consumers react and can the use of free offers in promotions catch 
consumers and thus increase sales? To help answering these questions, this 
dissertation studies two promotions that involve a free offer—namely premi-
ums, which are free gifts offered with the purchase of a product at its regular 
price and free trial promotions, which offer consumers the chance to try a ser-
vice at no costs over a limited time period. Examples of premium promotions 
are toy-trucks with the purchase of washing powder and toys or glasses with 
McDonald’s Happy Meals. Free trials are predominantly used for contractual 
services such as AOL, which offered free internet hours, and Microsoft, which 
offers free software trials via internet.  
 Free offers have already received attention in academic research. The next 
section reviews these studies and their findings to provide an overview of free 
offers in promotions and their effects.  
1.2. Review of Research on Free Promotions  
Firms regularly use promotions that involve free offers, such as bonus packs or 
‘Buy one get one free’ promotions, free samples, premium promotions, and free 
trial promotions. In this section, we first discuss the relevant research sorted by 
promotion type and second evaluate what has in general been found on the role 
CHAPTER 1 
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of free in promotional research. Table 1.1 presents an overview of the studied 
relationships and effects of promotions that involve a free offer. 
 Studies on premium promotions (Chandran and Morwitz 2006; D'Astous 
and Jacob 2002; Darke and Chung 2005; Shimp, Dyer, and Divita 1976) report 
inconsistent findings with regard to the promotion’s effects on choice (Nunes 
and Park 2003; Simonson, Carmon, and O'Curry 1994). While Nunes and Park 
(2003) find positive sales effects, Simonson et al. (1994) show that premiums 
have no or even a negative impact. In a recent study with panel data on multiple 
premiums, Gedenk et al. (2010) report that some premiums positively affect 
sales while some have no or even a negative impact. Important factors that 
determine a premium’s effectiveness have either not been studied or have not 
been sufficiently understood and require further attention.  
 The reviewed literature on free offers as incentives shows a lack of studies 
on the effects of free-trial promotions. Laochumnanvanit and Bednall (2005) 
formulate propositions on the evaluation of the trial, but neither empirically 
test these propositions nor consider behavioral effects or sales. Thus, there 
exists no empirical evidence on how free trials affect either evaluative or be-
havioral outcomes.  
 Contrary to free trials, there exist multiple studies on the effects of free 
product samples. Free samples are distinct from free service trials, because the 
former offers a fixed consumption amount whereas the latter provides a fixed 
consumption period. During this consumption period, the consumer can freely 
decide on the extent to which she uses the service. Thus, investigating usage 
becomes necessary. The findings of the reviewed studies reveal that samples 
exert positive effects on attitudinal measures and lead to immediate sales in-
creases (Bawa and Shoemaker 2004; Heiman et al. 2001; Manchanda, Ying, and 
Youn 2008). Moreover, Gedenk and Neslin (1999) report that samples can lead 
to more positive purchase event feedback – a higher likelihood of future brand 
purchases – than monetary promotions.  
 Bonus pack promotions involve promotional packages of a product with 
free extra content (Chen et al. 2012; Diamond 1992; Hardesty and Bearden 
2003). A variation is the ‘Buy one get one free’ promotion, which offers a se-
cond unit of the product for free (Sinha and Smith 2000). Of the reviewed stud-
ies on bonus pack promotions, none examines behavioral effects. Moreover, the 
comparison of bonus packs and price cuts has barely received any attention 
(Ong et al. 1997). Apparently, the focus so far has been on the investigation of 
different moderators of the relative performance of bonus packs and price cuts. 
For instance, Mishra and Mishra (2011) find that a price cut is preferred over a 
bonus pack for unhealthy food, because consumers look for justification of the 
purchase. The relationship reverses for healthy food because no monetary jus-
tification to buy more healthy food is necessary. 
INTRODUCTION 
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 Generally, research on free offers as incentives to purchase has investigat-
ed a variety of different product categories and factors that were expected to 
have an influence such as type of brand or framing of the promotion. The find-
ings suggest that promotions involving a free offer can be effective tools to im-
prove consumers’ attitudes and perceptions (Bettinger, Dawson, and Wales 
1979; D'Astous and Jacob 2002) as well as their purchase behavior (Heiman et 
al. 2001; Nunes and Park 2003). Noticeably, the different presentations of the 
free offer, for example as a free gift or as free extra content, influence consum-
ers reactions. The investigated moderators vary across the reviewed studies. 
For example, consumer skepticism is an issue in research on premium promo-
tions (Brown and Carpenter 2000; Simonson 1999), but much less in research 
on samples or bonus packs. Moreover, the depth of the promotion is recognized 
as a crucial factor in studies on the effectiveness of bonus packs and premium 
promotions, but not in research on sample promotions. While each promotion 
type has its own peculiarities and effects that deserve separate attention, some 
mechanisms are shared by most promotions that involve a free offer.  
1.2.1. Theoretical Considerations of Free 
The reviewed studies on promotions involving a free offer indicate that free 
requires particular attention. Indeed, free triggers a number of different mech-
anisms.  
 Interestingly, the mere mentioning of free causes consumers to process 
information differently: Shampanier et al. (2007) show that free not only re-
duces costs, but also increases the product’s benefits, which leads to an over-
valuation of the free product’s value. Similarly, Gaeth et al. (1991) report that 
consumers tend to value free gifts higher than their actual retail value.  
 Moreover, promotions involving a free offer are less likely incorporated 
into the product’s price, because these promotions are perceived by consumers 
as very salient (Chandran and Morwitz 2006) and deemphasize price argu-
ments. According to mental accounting theory, free-offer promotions are per-
ceived as a separated gain rather than a reduction of a loss (the price) (Kahne-
man and Tversky 1979; Thaler 2008). Free offers can easily become incom-
mensurate resources (Nunes and Park 2003), if they are not framed in the same 
currency as the product’s price, but focus on ‘free’. That means consumers can-
not easily compare the value of the free offer to the underlying product’s price 
and have to base their evaluation of the promotion on other grounds. The re-
sults of such evaluations are often favorable for a promotion’s perceived value. 
Free offers move consumers’ focus away from price and thus avoid that con-
sumers’ perceptions of quality, deal value, and brand equity are negatively af-
fected as may be the case with regular price discounts (Darke and Chung 2005; 
CHAPTER 1 
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Palazón-Vidal and Delgado-Ballester 2005; Sprott and Shimp 2004). The sali-
ence of free offers can be very advantageous, because free offers may serve as a 
heuristic to solve complex choice tasks (Brown and Carpenter 2000).  
 
Ta
bl
e 
1.
1 
St
ud
ie
s 
on
 F
re
e 
O
ffe
rs
 in
 P
ro
m
ot
io
ns
 
Au
tho
rs 
Pu
rp
os
e 
Da
ta 
Co
nte
xt 
Ma
jor
 Fi
nd
ing
s 
Pr
em
ium
 Pr
om
oti
on
s 
Sh
im
p e
t a
l. 1
97
6 
Eff
ect
s o
f p
res
en
tin
g a
 pr
em
ium
 in
 
TV
 co
mm
erc
ial
s o
n c
hil
dr
en
’s’ 
ch
oic
es 
La
b e
xp
eri
me
nt 
Pr
od
uc
t: c
ere
als
, p
rem
ium
: 
Na
tio
na
l F
oo
tba
ll L
ea
gu
e 
tea
m 
pa
tch
 
Pr
ese
nti
ng
 a p
rem
ium
 do
es 
no
t in
flu
en
ce 
pr
od
uc
t 
inf
orm
ati
on
 re
co
gn
itio
n n
or
 do
es 
lik
ing
 th
e p
rem
ium
 
inc
rea
se 
the
 pr
od
uc
t’s
 ap
pe
al.
  
Pr
est
on
 et
 al
. 1
97
8 
Eff
ect
 of
 pr
em
ium
s o
n r
ete
nti
on
 
an
d p
erf
orm
an
ce 
of 
ba
nk
 de
po
sit
s 
Fie
ld 
stu
dy
 / 
pa
ne
l d
ata
 
 Pr
em
ium
s: c
oo
kw
are
, 
cal
cu
lat
or 
No
 di
ffe
ren
ce 
in 
ret
en
tio
n r
ate
s, l
oy
alt
y, o
r d
ep
os
it 
pe
rfo
rm
an
ce 
co
uld
 be
 fo
un
d. 
Lo
w 
an
d L
ich
ten
-
ste
in 
19
93
 
Eff
ect
s o
f d
ou
ble
-de
als
 (p
ric
e a
nd
 
pr
em
ium
 pr
om
oti
on
s) 
on
 
co
ns
um
ers
’ at
tit
ud
es 
 
La
b e
xp
eri
me
nt 
Pr
od
uc
t: c
alc
ula
tor
, 
Pr
em
ium
: b
ack
pa
ck
 
If a
dv
ert
ise
d r
efe
ren
ce 
pr
ice
 is 
hig
h (
low
), a
tti
tud
es 
are
 
mo
st 
fav
ora
ble
, if
 th
e p
rem
ium
 va
lue
 is 
als
o h
igh
 (lo
w)
.  
Sim
on
so
n e
t a
l. 
19
94
 
Eff
ect
s o
f p
rod
uc
t fe
atu
res
 an
d 
pr
em
ium
s o
n c
on
su
me
rs’
 
pr
efe
ren
ces
 an
d s
ale
s 
La
b e
xp
eri
me
nt 
Ex
am
ple
 pr
od
uc
t c
ate
go
ry 
– 
pr
em
ium
: C
ak
e m
ix 
an
d a
 
co
lle
cto
r’s
 pl
ate
 
If t
he
 va
lue
 of
 a f
ea
tur
e/
pr
em
ium
 is 
am
big
uo
us
, 
co
ns
um
ers
 av
oid
 pu
rch
asi
ng
 th
e p
ro
du
ct.
 If 
thi
s 
seg
me
nt 
is l
arg
e c
om
pa
red
 to
 th
e s
eg
me
nt 
tha
t 
pe
rce
ive
s t
he
 fe
atu
re/
pr
em
ium
 as
 at
tra
cti
ve
, th
e 
br
an
d’s
 ch
oic
e p
ro
ba
bil
ity
 de
cre
ase
s.  
Br
ow
n a
nd
 Ca
rp
en
-
ter
 20
00
 
Eff
ect
s o
f tr
ivi
al 
pr
od
uc
t-r
ela
ted
 
an
d –
un
rel
ate
d (
pr
om
oti
on
al)
 
att
rib
ute
s o
n c
on
su
me
rs’
 ch
oic
es 
La
b e
xp
eri
me
nt 
Pr
od
uc
t c
ate
go
ry:
 Sh
am
po
o/
 
Pr
od
uc
t-r
ela
ted
 tr
ivi
al 
att
rib
ute
: g
ive
s s
ilk
y h
air
 / 
pr
od
uc
t-u
nr
ela
ted
: u
mb
rel
la 
In 
a t
hr
ee
 br
an
d c
ho
ice
, a 
tri
via
l a
ttr
ibu
te 
act
s a
s a
 
de
cis
ion
 cu
e a
nd
 ha
s a
 po
sit
ive
 ef
fec
t o
n c
ho
ice
, if
 
me
rel
y o
ne
 br
an
d h
as 
it. 
Ho
we
ve
r, i
f tw
o b
ran
ds
 ha
ve
 
the
 tr
ivi
al 
att
rib
ute
, th
e t
hir
d b
ran
d g
ain
s. N
o d
iffe
ren
ce 
in 
eff
ect
ive
ne
ss 
wa
s f
ou
nd
 fo
r p
rod
uc
t-r
ela
ted
 an
d –
 
un
rel
ate
d t
riv
ial
 at
tri
bu
tes
. 
Ch
an
do
n e
t a
l. 2
00
0 
Inv
est
iga
tin
g t
he
 ef
fec
ts 
of 
be
ne
fit 
co
ng
ru
en
cy 
on
 pr
om
oti
on
al 
eff
ect
ive
ne
ss 
La
b e
xp
eri
me
nt 
Ut
ilit
ari
an
 an
d h
ed
on
ic 
pr
od
uc
t c
ate
go
rie
s/ 
Fr
ee
 
gif
t: r
ed
 ro
se 
Mo
ne
tar
y p
rom
oti
on
s o
ffe
r m
ain
ly 
uti
lita
ria
n, 
no
n-
mo
ne
tar
y p
rom
oti
on
s m
ain
ly 
he
do
nic
 be
ne
fits
. 
Be
ne
fit 
co
ng
ru
en
cy 
is a
t w
ork
 fo
r h
igh
 eq
uit
y b
ran
ds
: 
mo
ne
tar
y p
rom
oti
on
s p
erf
orm
 be
tte
r fo
r u
tili
tar
ian
 
pr
od
uc
ts 
tha
n n
on
-m
on
eta
ry 
pr
om
oti
on
s. F
or 
he
do
nic
 
pr
od
uc
ts 
it i
s t
he
 ot
he
r w
ay
 ar
ou
nd
. 
Ge
de
nk
 et
 al
. 2
00
0 
Th
e e
ffe
cts
 of
 pr
em
ium
s o
n 
pu
rch
ase
 lik
eli
ho
od
 
La
b e
xp
eri
me
nt 
Ex
am
ple
: p
rod
uc
t: 
ph
oto
film
, p
rem
ium
s: e
ith
er 
a f
ram
e o
r a
 fil
mb
ox
  
Pr
em
ium
s d
o n
ot 
inc
rea
se 
pu
rch
ase
 lik
eli
ho
od
. 
INTRODUCTION 
17 
Au
tho
rs 
Pu
rp
os
e 
Da
ta 
Co
nte
xt 
Ma
jor
 Fi
nd
ing
s 
D’A
sto
us
 an
d J
aco
b 
20
02
 
Un
de
rst
an
din
g c
on
su
me
rs’
 
rea
cti
on
s t
o p
rem
ium
-ba
sed
 
pr
om
oti
on
al 
off
ers
 
Su
rve
y 
35
 di
ffe
ren
t p
rod
uc
t-
pr
em
ium
 co
mb
ina
tio
ns
  
Ev
alu
ati
on
 of
 th
e d
ea
l is
 m
ore
 po
sit
ive
, if
 th
e p
rem
ium
 is 
dir
ect
, if
 th
e v
alu
e i
s m
en
tio
ne
d, 
if t
he
 qu
an
tit
y t
o 
pu
rch
ase
 is 
rel
ati
ve
ly 
low
; if
 br
an
d a
tti
tud
e i
s p
os
itiv
e, i
f 
int
ere
st 
in 
the
 pr
em
ium
 is 
hig
h, 
an
d i
f c
on
su
me
rs 
are
 
de
al-
pr
on
e a
nd
 co
mp
uls
ive
. 
Nu
ne
s a
nd
 Pa
rk 
20
03
 
Th
e e
ffe
ct 
of 
the
 pr
om
oti
on
s’ 
inc
om
me
ns
ur
ab
ilit
y o
n 
co
ns
um
ers
’ ev
alu
ati
on
s 
La
b e
xp
eri
me
nt 
/ 
fie
ld 
stu
dy
 
Pr
od
uc
t: b
lan
ke
t, p
rem
ium
: 
um
br
ell
a /
 pr
od
uc
t: d
og
 
tre
at,
 pr
em
ium
: ca
n o
pe
ne
r 
Co
mm
un
ica
tin
g a
 pr
om
oti
on
 in
 a d
iffe
ren
t c
ur
ren
cy 
tha
n p
ric
e h
elp
s t
o a
vo
id 
rel
ati
vis
tic
 pr
oc
ess
ing
, w
hic
h 
oft
en
 de
cre
ase
s a
 pr
om
oti
on
’s p
erc
eiv
ed
 va
lue
. 
Pr
em
ium
s le
ad
 to
 a s
ho
rt-
ter
m 
sal
es 
inc
rea
se.
 
Ra
gh
ub
ir 2
00
4 
Th
e e
ffe
ct 
of 
the
 pr
od
uc
t’s
 va
lue
 
on
 th
e f
ree
 gi
ft’s
 pe
rce
ive
d v
alu
e  
La
b e
xp
eri
me
nt 
Pr
od
uc
t: B
ott
le 
of 
alc
oh
oli
c 
be
ve
rag
e, p
rem
ium
: p
en
, 
pe
arl
 ne
ck
lac
e/
br
ace
let
  
Pr
em
ium
s a
re 
va
lue
d m
ore
 (le
ss)
 fa
vo
rab
ly,
 if 
off
ere
d 
wi
th 
an
 ex
pe
ns
ive
 (le
ss 
ex
pe
ns
ive
) p
rod
uc
t.  
Da
rke
 an
d C
hu
ng
 
20
05
 
Th
e e
ffe
cts
 of
 a f
ree
 gi
ft r
ela
tiv
e t
o 
a p
ric
e c
ut 
on
 pe
rce
ive
d d
ea
l v
alu
e 
an
d p
rod
uc
t q
ua
lity
 
La
b e
xp
eri
me
nt 
Pr
od
uc
t: h
ea
dp
ho
ne
, 
pr
em
ium
: C
D 
A f
ree
 gi
ft l
ea
ds
 to
 a h
igh
er 
pe
rce
ive
d d
ea
l v
alu
e a
nd
 to
 
mo
re 
fav
ora
ble
 qu
ali
ty 
rat
ing
s o
f th
e p
rod
uc
ts 
tha
n a
 
pr
ice
 cu
t in
 sit
ua
tio
ns
 of
 ne
ga
tiv
e q
ua
lity
 in
fer
en
ces
. 
Pa
laz
on
-Vi
da
l a
nd
 
De
lga
do
-Ba
lle
ste
r 
20
05
 
Th
e e
ffe
cts
 of
 pr
em
ium
s r
ela
tiv
e 
to 
pr
ice
 cu
ts 
on
 br
an
d e
qu
ity
 
La
b e
xp
eri
me
nt 
Ex
am
ple
: p
rod
uc
t: c
ho
co
lat
e, 
pr
em
ium
: p
air
 of
 ea
rri
ng
s 
Pr
em
ium
s a
re 
mo
re 
eff
ect
ive
 th
an
 pr
ice
 cu
ts 
in 
inc
rea
sin
g b
ran
d k
no
wl
ed
ge
 an
d n
et 
fav
ora
bil
ity
 of
 
ass
oc
iat
ion
s. P
ric
e c
uts
 le
ad
 to
 be
tte
r e
va
lua
tio
ns
 fo
r 
uti
lita
ria
n t
ha
n f
or
 he
do
nic
 pr
od
uc
t c
ate
go
rie
s, w
hil
e 
pr
em
ium
s p
erf
or
m 
eq
ua
lly
 w
ell
 in
 bo
th 
cat
eg
ori
es.
 
Ch
an
dr
an
 an
d 
Mo
rw
itz
 20
06
 
Ar
e n
on
-m
on
eta
ry 
or 
mo
ne
tar
y 
pr
om
oti
on
s m
ore
 su
sce
pti
ble
 to
 
ne
ga
tiv
e c
on
tex
tua
l in
flu
en
ces
? 
La
b e
xp
eri
me
nts
 
Pr
od
uc
t: k
ey
bo
ard
, 
pr
em
ium
: fr
ee
 m
ou
se 
Th
e s
ali
en
ce 
of 
fre
e p
rom
oti
on
s le
av
es 
pe
rce
pti
on
s o
f 
qu
ali
ty 
an
d p
ur
ch
ase
 in
ten
tio
ns
 un
ch
an
ge
d r
eg
ard
les
s 
of 
wh
eth
er 
po
sit
ive
 or
 ne
ga
tiv
e p
ro
du
ct 
inf
orm
ati
on
 ar
e 
pr
ov
ide
d. 
Mo
ne
tar
y p
rom
oti
on
s a
re 
sen
sit
ive
 to
 th
e 
va
len
ce 
of 
inf
orm
ati
on
.  
Ge
de
nk
 et
 al
. 2
01
0 
Wh
at 
dr
ive
s t
he
 ef
fec
tiv
en
ess
 of
 
pr
om
oti
on
s? 
Fie
ld 
stu
dy
 / 
pa
ne
l d
ata
 
Pr
od
uc
t: w
om
en
 m
ag
azi
ne
, 
pr
em
ium
s: 5
6 d
iffe
ren
t o
ne
s 
e.g
. b
oo
kle
ts 
or
 CD
s 
Pr
em
ium
s h
av
e o
n a
ve
rag
e a
 po
sit
ive
 im
pa
ct 
on
 sa
les
, 
bu
t 1
2.5
% 
of 
the
 pr
em
ium
s le
ad
 to
 a s
ale
s d
ecr
ea
se.
 
Eff
ect
ive
ne
ss 
is i
nc
rea
sed
 th
rou
gh
 ad
ve
rti
sin
g a
nd
 if 
pr
em
ium
s a
re 
les
s s
im
ila
r t
o t
he
 pr
od
uc
t a
nd
 ha
ve
 
str
on
ge
r u
tili
tar
ian
 ra
the
r t
ha
n h
ed
on
ic b
en
efi
ts.
  
 
CHAPTER 1 
18 
IN
TR
OD
UC
TIO
N 
Au
tho
rs 
Pu
rp
os
e 
Da
ta 
Co
nte
xt 
Ma
jor
 Fi
nd
ing
s 
Fr
ee
 Se
rvi
ce 
Tr
ial
 Pr
om
oti
on
s 
La
ch
ou
mv
an
it a
nd
 
Be
dn
all
 20
05
 
Co
ns
um
ers
’ ev
alu
ati
on
 of
 fre
e 
ser
vic
e t
ria
l o
ffe
rs 
Th
eo
ret
ica
l 
pr
op
os
itio
ns
 
 
Th
e h
igh
er 
the
 le
ve
l o
f s
ke
pti
cis
m,
 pe
rce
ive
d o
bli
ga
tio
n, 
an
d r
eci
pr
oc
ati
on
 tr
ait
s, t
he
 le
ss 
lik
ely
 co
ns
um
ers
 
red
ee
m 
a f
ree
 se
rvi
ce 
tri
al 
off
er.
 Al
so
, th
ey
 ar
e m
ore
 
sk
ep
tic
al 
wi
th 
fre
e t
ria
ls o
f c
red
en
ce 
tha
n o
f e
xp
eri
en
ce 
ser
vic
es.
  
Sa
mp
le 
Pr
om
oti
on
s 
Ha
mm
 et
 al
. 1
96
9 
Th
e e
ffe
cts
 of
 sa
mp
le 
pr
om
oti
on
s 
on
 pr
od
uc
t im
ag
e a
nd
 pu
rch
ase
 
int
en
tio
ns
 
La
b e
xp
eri
me
nt 
Ha
irs
pr
ay
 
Sa
mp
le 
pr
om
oti
on
s p
os
itiv
ely
 in
flu
en
ce 
the
 pr
od
uc
t’s
 
im
ag
e a
s w
ell
 as
 co
ns
um
ers
’ p
ur
ch
ase
 in
ten
tio
ns
.  
Sco
tt 1
97
6 
Th
e e
ffe
cts
 of
 tr
ial
 an
d i
nc
en
tiv
es 
on
 re
pe
at 
pu
rch
ase
 be
ha
vio
r 
Fie
ld 
stu
dy
 / 
pa
ne
l d
ata
 
Su
bs
cri
pti
on
 be
ha
vio
r a
fte
r 
a r
eg
ula
r p
ric
e t
ria
l, a
 fre
e 
tri
al,
 a t
ria
l a
t 5
0%
 di
sco
un
t, 
a f
ree
 an
d p
rem
ium
 tr
ial
 
On
ly 
the
 tr
ial
 at
 a 5
0%
 di
sco
un
t s
ign
ific
an
tly
 in
cre
ase
d 
su
bs
cri
pti
on
s a
bo
ve
 th
e c
old
-ca
llin
g r
esu
lts
. 
Be
tti
ng
er 
et 
al.
 19
79
Th
e e
ffe
cts
 of
 fre
e s
am
ple
 
pr
om
oti
on
s o
n c
on
su
me
rs’
 
pe
rce
pti
on
s a
nd
 at
tit
ud
es 
La
b e
xp
eri
me
nt 
Pe
an
ut 
bu
tte
r 
A s
am
ple
 pr
om
oti
on
 in
cre
ase
s a
tti
tud
es 
tow
ard
 an
d 
pe
rce
pti
on
s o
f th
e p
rom
ote
d p
rod
uc
t.  
Sm
ith
 an
d S
wi
ny
ard
 
19
83
 
Th
e i
mp
act
 of
 pr
od
uc
t s
am
pli
ng
 
co
mp
are
d t
o a
dv
ert
isi
ng
 on
 
att
itu
de
-be
ha
vio
r c
on
sis
ten
cy 
La
b e
xp
eri
me
nt 
Sn
ack
 fo
od
s 
At
tit
ud
es 
ba
sed
 on
 pr
od
uc
t s
am
pli
ng
 pr
ed
ict
 pu
rch
ase
s 
ve
ry 
we
ll. 
At
tit
ud
es 
ba
sed
 on
 ad
ve
rti
sin
g, h
ow
ev
er,
 do
 
no
t p
red
ict
 pu
rch
ase
s a
s w
ell
. 
Ma
rks
 an
d K
am
ins
 
19
88
 
Th
e e
ffe
cts
 of
 se
qu
en
ce 
of 
ex
po
su
re 
of 
pr
od
uc
t s
am
pli
ng
 an
d 
ad
ve
rti
sin
g a
nd
 th
e e
ffe
cts
 of
 
de
gre
e o
f a
dv
ert
isi
ng
 cla
im
 
ex
ag
ge
rat
ion
 on
 co
ns
um
ers
’ b
eli
ef 
str
en
gth
  
La
b e
xp
eri
me
nts
 
 
Sa
mp
lin
g l
ea
ds
 to
 m
ore
 be
lie
f a
nd
 at
tit
ud
e c
on
fid
en
ce 
tha
n a
dv
ert
isi
ng
 an
d a
tti
tud
e c
ha
ng
es 
are
 gr
ea
ter
 if 
co
ns
um
ers
 re
cei
ve
 an
 ad
ve
rti
sin
g-s
am
ple
 ra
the
r t
ha
n a
 
sam
ple
-ad
ve
rti
sin
g e
xp
os
ur
e s
eq
ue
nc
e.  
Ke
mp
f a
nd
 Sm
ith
 
19
98
 
Th
e e
ffe
ct 
of 
pr
ior
 ad
ve
rti
sin
g o
n 
co
ns
um
er 
pr
oc
ess
ing
 of
 a p
rod
uc
t 
tri
al 
La
b e
xp
eri
me
nt 
So
ftw
are
 pr
og
ram
s: v
iru
s 
sca
nn
er,
 gr
am
ma
r c
he
ck
er 
Pr
etr
ial
 ad
ve
rti
sin
g e
xp
os
ur
e h
as 
str
on
g p
os
itiv
e e
ffe
cts
 
on
 br
an
d a
tti
tud
e o
f p
rod
uc
ts 
low
 on
 di
ag
no
sti
cit
y. 
Br
an
d a
tti
tud
es 
of 
pr
od
uc
ts 
hig
h o
n d
iag
no
sti
cit
y a
re 
no
t a
ffe
cte
d. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
19 
Au
tho
rs 
Pu
rp
os
e 
Da
ta 
Co
nte
xt 
Ma
jor
 Fi
nd
ing
s 
Ge
de
nk
 an
d N
esl
in 
19
99
 
Th
e e
ffe
ct 
of 
fre
e s
am
ple
s o
n 
fut
ur
e b
ran
d l
oy
alt
y a
nd
 pu
rch
ase
 
ev
en
t fe
ed
ba
ck
 
Pa
ne
l d
ata
 
Yo
gu
rt,
 m
ine
ral
 w
ate
r 
Sa
mp
les
 le
ad
 to
 m
ore
 po
sit
ive
 pu
rch
ase
 ev
en
t fe
ed
ba
ck
 
an
d g
rea
ter
 lo
ya
lty
 th
an
 pr
ice
 cu
ts.
 
He
im
an
 et
 al
. 2
00
1 
Ho
w 
to 
us
e p
rod
uc
t s
am
pli
ng
 ov
er 
tim
e t
o g
en
era
te 
lea
rn
ing
 an
d 
mi
nim
ize
 th
e f
org
ett
ing
 ef
fec
t? 
Pa
ne
l d
ata
 
 
Sa
mp
lin
g h
as 
a s
tro
ng
 po
sit
ive
 in
flu
en
ce 
on
 im
me
dia
te 
sal
es.
 M
ore
ov
er,
 it 
fam
ilia
riz
es 
co
ns
um
ers
 w
ith
 th
e 
pr
od
uc
t in
 its
 ea
rly
 ph
ase
s o
f th
e p
ro
du
ct 
life
 cy
cle
 an
d 
he
lps
 to
 fo
rco
me
 th
e f
org
ett
ing
 ef
fec
t in
 m
ore
 m
atu
re 
ph
ase
s.  
Ba
wa
 an
d S
ho
e-
ma
ke
r 2
00
4 
Th
e e
ffe
cts
 of
 sa
mp
le 
pr
om
oti
on
s 
on
 in
cre
me
nta
l b
ran
d s
ale
s 
Fie
ld 
stu
dy
 / 
pa
ne
l d
ata
 
 
Fre
e s
am
ple
 pr
om
oti
on
s in
cre
ase
 sa
les
 up
 to
 52
 w
ee
ks
 
rel
ati
ve
 to
 th
e c
on
tro
l g
rou
p (
no
 pr
om
oti
on
). 
Sp
rot
t a
nd
 Sh
im
p 
20
04
 
Th
e e
ffe
cts
 of
 sa
mp
le 
pr
om
oti
on
s 
on
 pe
rce
ive
d q
ua
lity
 
La
b e
xp
eri
me
nt 
Be
ve
rag
e 
Sa
mp
lin
g l
ea
ds
 to
 an
 in
cre
ase
 in
 pe
rce
ive
d q
ua
lity
 fo
r 
hig
h r
ath
er 
tha
n l
ow
 qu
ali
ty 
sto
re 
br
an
ds
. N
o e
ffe
cts
 ar
e 
ob
ser
ve
d f
or 
na
tio
na
l b
ran
ds
.  
Ma
nc
ha
nd
a e
t a
l. 
20
08
 
Th
e e
ffe
ct 
of 
tar
ge
ted
 
co
mm
un
ica
tio
n (
de
tai
lin
g a
nd
 
sam
pli
ng
) a
nd
 co
nta
gio
n o
n 
pr
od
uc
t a
do
pti
on
 
 
Fie
ld 
stu
dy
 / 
pa
ne
l d
ata
 
Ad
op
tio
n o
f n
ew
 dr
ug
s b
y 
ph
ysi
cia
ns
 / s
am
ple
s: n
ew
 
dr
ug
s 
De
tai
lin
g, s
am
pli
ng
 as
 w
ell
 as
 co
nta
gio
n h
av
e p
os
itiv
e 
eff
ect
s o
n a
do
pti
on
 lik
eli
ho
od
. 
Bo
nu
s P
ack
s  
Dia
mo
nd
 19
92
 
Co
ns
um
ers
 re
act
ion
s t
o p
ric
e 
dis
co
un
ts 
ve
rsu
s e
xtr
a p
rod
uc
t 
pr
om
oti
on
s 
Su
rve
y /
 la
b 
ex
pe
rim
en
t 
% 
off
 ve
rsu
s $
 or
 oz
. fr
ee
 
ex
tra
 pr
od
uc
t 
Wh
ere
as 
for
 ve
ry 
low
 pr
om
oti
on
al 
lev
els
 ex
tra
 pr
od
uc
t 
pr
om
oti
on
s m
ay
 pe
rfo
rm
 be
tte
r t
ha
n p
ric
e d
isc
ou
nts
, 
thi
s r
ela
tio
ns
hip
 re
ve
rse
s fo
r h
igh
 pr
om
oti
on
 le
ve
ls. 
 
On
g e
t a
l. 1
99
7 
Co
ns
um
er 
pe
rce
pti
on
s o
f b
on
us
 
pa
ck
s 
La
b e
xp
eri
me
nt 
/ 
ex
plo
rat
ory
 fie
ld 
stu
dy
 
Bo
nu
s p
ack
s f
or 
lot
ion
: 8
0%
 
or 
60
% 
mo
re 
fre
e 
Co
ns
um
ers
 di
d n
ot 
pe
rce
ive
 th
ese
 of
fer
s a
s v
ery
 
be
lie
va
ble
 an
d s
us
pe
ct 
tha
t p
ric
es 
are
 ra
ise
d d
ur
ing
 th
e 
pr
om
oti
on
al 
pe
rio
d. 
Bo
nu
s p
ack
s d
id 
no
t in
cre
ase
 
co
ns
um
ers
’ in
ten
tio
n t
o p
ur
ch
ase
 a h
igh
er 
qu
an
tit
y t
ha
n 
us
ua
l. 
CHAPTER 1 
20 
IN
TR
OD
UC
TIO
N 
Au
tho
rs 
Pu
rp
os
e 
Da
ta 
Co
nte
xt 
Ma
jor
 Fi
nd
ing
s 
Sin
ha
 an
d S
mi
th 
20
00
 
Co
ns
um
ers
’ p
erc
ep
tio
ns
 of
 
pr
om
oti
on
al 
fra
mi
ng
 of
 pr
ice
  
La
b e
xp
eri
me
nt 
Pr
ice
 cu
t v
ers
us
 Bu
y-o
ne
-
ge
t-o
ne
-fr
ee
 / b
rea
d, 
ba
th 
tis
su
e, d
ete
rge
nt,
 ch
ee
se 
Pr
ice
 cu
ts 
lea
d t
o h
igh
est
 pe
rce
ive
d t
ran
sac
tio
n v
alu
e. 
Ho
we
ve
r, f
or 
sto
ck
-up
 ite
ms
, ex
tra
 pr
od
uc
t p
rom
oti
on
s 
are
 m
ore
 su
cce
ssf
ul 
tha
n p
ric
e c
uts
, w
hil
e p
ric
e c
uts
 
pe
rfo
rm
 be
tte
r fo
r n
on
-st
oc
k-u
p i
tem
s.  
 
Ha
rd
est
y a
nd
 
Be
ard
en
 20
03
  
Co
ns
um
ers
’ ev
alu
ati
on
 of
 di
ffe
ren
t 
pr
om
oti
on
 ty
pe
s (
bo
nu
s 
pa
ck
s/p
ric
e c
uts
) a
nd
 pr
ice
 
pr
ese
nta
tio
ns
 (d
oll
ars
/-
pe
rce
nta
ge
s) 
de
pe
nd
ing
 on
 th
e 
pr
om
oti
on
al 
be
ne
fit 
lev
el 
La
b e
xp
eri
me
nt 
To
oth
pa
ste
, b
ath
 so
ap
, 
lau
nd
ry 
de
ter
ge
nt,
 ha
nd
 
lot
ion
, ki
tch
en
 tr
ash
 ba
gs 
/ 
Pr
ice
 cu
ts:
 %
 or
 $ o
ff /
 
Bo
nu
s p
ack
s: %
 m
ore
 fre
e o
r 
$ m
ore
 fre
e 
Bo
nu
s p
ack
s a
nd
 pr
ice
 cu
ts 
are
 eq
ua
lly
 ev
alu
ate
d f
or 
low
 an
d m
od
era
te 
pr
om
oti
on
al 
be
ne
fit 
lev
els
, w
hil
e 
pr
ice
 cu
ts 
are
 ev
alu
ate
d m
ore
 fa
vo
rab
ly 
for
 th
e h
igh
 
be
ne
fit 
lev
els
. M
ore
ov
er,
 th
e p
res
en
tat
ion
 in
 do
lla
rs 
or 
pe
rce
nta
ge
s is
 va
lue
d e
qu
all
y f
or 
mo
de
rat
e b
en
efi
t 
lev
els
, w
hil
e f
or
 hi
gh
 be
ne
fit 
lev
els
 th
e p
res
en
tat
ion
 in
 
pe
rce
nta
ge
s is
 fa
vo
red
. 
Mi
sh
ra 
an
d M
ish
ra 
20
11
 
Th
e i
nfl
ue
nc
e o
f p
ric
e d
isc
ou
nt 
ve
rsu
s b
on
us
 pa
ck
 on
 th
e 
pr
efe
ren
ce 
for
 he
alt
hy
 an
d 
un
he
alt
hy
 fo
od
 
La
b e
xp
eri
me
nt 
Ch
oc
ola
te 
cak
e v
ers
us
 fru
it 
sal
ad
 / c
ho
co
lat
e v
ers
us
 
rai
sin
s /
 20
% 
off
 ve
rsu
s 
20
% 
mo
re 
Fo
r u
nh
ea
lth
y f
oo
d, 
a p
ric
e c
ut 
is p
ref
err
ed
 ov
er 
a b
on
us
 
pa
ck
 be
cau
se 
co
ns
um
ers
 lo
ok
 fo
r ju
sti
fic
ati
on
 of
 th
e 
pu
rch
ase
. T
he
 re
lat
ion
sh
ip 
rev
ers
es 
for
 he
alt
hy
 fo
od
 
be
cau
se 
no
 ju
sti
fic
ati
on
 to
 bu
y m
or
e h
ea
lth
y f
oo
d i
s 
ne
ces
sar
y.  
Ch
en
 et
 al
. 2
01
2 
Th
e i
mp
act
 of
 ba
se 
va
lue
 ne
gle
ct 
on
 co
ns
um
er 
pr
efe
ren
ces
 fo
r 
bo
nu
s p
ack
s o
ve
r p
ric
e d
isc
ou
nts
 
Fie
ld 
ex
pe
rim
en
t 
/ l
ab
 ex
pe
rim
en
t 
nu
me
ric
all
y e
qu
iva
len
t: 3
3%
 
mo
re 
ve
rsu
s 3
3%
 of
f /
 
eco
no
mi
cal
ly 
eq
uiv
ale
nt:
 
50
% 
mo
re 
ve
rsu
s 3
3%
 of
f 
Ge
ne
ral
ly,
 co
ns
um
ers
 pr
efe
r a
 bo
nu
s p
ack
 ov
er 
an
 
eco
no
mi
cal
ly 
eq
uiv
ale
nt 
pr
ice
 di
sco
un
t. T
his
 pr
efe
ren
ce 
be
co
me
s w
ea
ke
r w
he
n i
t is
 ea
sy 
to 
co
mp
are
 th
e t
wo
 
pr
om
oti
on
s a
nd
 w
he
n b
oth
 pe
rce
nta
ge
 va
lue
s a
re 
sm
all
 
(an
d c
los
e t
o e
ach
 ot
he
r).
 Fo
r fa
mi
lia
r a
nd
 in
ex
pe
ns
ive
 
pr
od
uc
ts 
co
ns
um
ers
 ar
e i
nd
iffe
ren
t b
etw
ee
n a
 bo
nu
s 
pa
ck
 an
d a
 nu
me
ric
all
y (
no
t e
co
no
mi
cal
ly)
 eq
uiv
ale
nt 
pr
ice
 di
sco
un
t. F
or
 un
fam
ilia
r a
nd
 ex
pe
ns
ive
 pr
od
uc
ts,
 
the
 nu
me
ric
all
y e
qu
iva
len
t p
ric
e d
isc
ou
nt 
is p
ref
err
ed
.  
INTRODUCTION 
21 
CHAPTER 1 
22 
1.3. Objectives 
Free is an intriguing concept and its use as incentive to catch consumers has 
received some attention in literature. There seem to be general mechanisms at 
work, which are affected by the promotions’ individual characteristics. To shed 
further light on how free offers affect promotional effectiveness, we investigate 
two research questions:  
 What are the immediate effects of premium promotions on consumers’ 
incidence, choice and quantity decisions and how do these effects com-
pare with those of price cuts? 
 How do free trials influence consumers’ adoption decisions of contrac-
tual services? 
1.3.1. Premium Promotions 
The second chapter explores the immediate effects of premium promotions on 
consumers’ actual behavior and how premium effects compare to those of price 
cuts. Most research so far has investigated evaluative outcomes (D'Astous and 
Jacob 2002; D'Astous and Landreville 2003; Shimp et al. 1976) and consumer 
choice (e.g. Chandon, Wansink, and Laurent 2000; Gedenk, Hartmann, and 
Schulze 2000; Gedenk, Hoffmann, and Fantapié Altobelli 2008; Simonson et al. 
1994), but neglected consumers’ incidence and quantity decisions. Moreover, 
the studies on the effects on choice have reported inconsistent results, which 
require further attention. Another important contribution of our research is 
that we compare premium promotions to price cuts. Premium promotions are 
commonly used in the fast-moving consumer goods sector and thus form an 
alternative to price cuts. Yet, it is unclear how premiums compare to price cuts 
with regard to their effects on consumers’ behavioral decisions, namely inci-
dence, choice, and quantity. 
 We collect data via an online shopping experiment with seven consecutive 
weeks in which purchases of fast-moving-consumer-goods could be made. We 
build upon multiple theories to formulate expectations and hypotheses. In par-
ticular, we examine (1) how a premium promotion influences a consumer’s 
incidence, choice, and quantity decisions, (2) how a premium promotion com-
pares to a price cut, and (3) how this relative performance is influenced by 
three crucial moderators, namely category type – hedonism versus utilitarian-
ism, brand type – national brand versus private label, and premium-product 
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relatedness. We use a simultaneously estimated nested multinomial Logit  
model and a zero-truncated Poisson model with unobserved consumer hetero-
geneity to analyze the data. 
1.3.2. Free-Trial Promotions 
The objective of Chapter 3 is to examine whether (1) consumers choose free 
trials instead of the regular paid contract, whether (2) they adopt the regular 
paid contract more likely after using the trial, and (3) the extent to which usage 
intensity moderates the effect on adoption of the paid offer. Although compa-
nies regularly use free trials for innovative contractual services, academic re-
search has to the best of our knowledge not yet studied this relationship. Em-
pirical evidence on the influence of sales promotions on innovation adoption is 
limited and focuses mainly on products (Manchanda et al. 2008; Steenkamp 
and Gielens 2003). Prins and Verhoef (2007) and Nam et al. (2010) investigate 
actual adoption behavior of a new contractual service, but concentrate on mar-
keting variables other than sales promotions.  
 We use data on the introduction of digital TV from a major European tele-
communication provider that includes consumer-specific information, market-
ing-related variables, and behavioral data. We develop a framework that de-
scribes how a free trial affects acquisition and transaction utility (Thaler 1985) 
and triggers a set of specific utility premiums. This framework enables us to 
predict how a free trial influences consumers’ adoption likelihood. We use a 
multinomial Logit model to estimate our model. 
1.4. Dissertation Outline  
This dissertation is divided into four chapters of which Chapters 2 and 3 are the 
empirical studies. Chapter 4 concludes on the theoretical findings of the empiri-
cal studies, discusses the managerial implications, and provides suggestions for 
further research.  
 The study of Chapter 2 investigates the immediate effects of premium 
promotions on incidence, choice, and quantity, compares these effects to those 
of price cuts and examines three crucial moderators of this relationship. The 
study of Chapter 3 examines the effects of a free-trial promotion on adoption 
likelihood of a contractual service. Both studies rely on insights from promo-
tional literature, but differ in their set-up. On the one hand, we consider a free 
trial in a service setting and rely on panel data from a large company that we 
analyze using a multinomial Logit model. On the other hand, we study the effect 
of a premium attached to a product, collect data via an experiment and use a 
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nested multinomial Logit model and a zero-truncated Poisson model with un-
observed consumer heterogeneity. Moreover, the way the free offer is provided 
differs. Premiums are conditional on purchasing a product at its regular price 
and thus dependent on purchase. Free-trial promotions are offered uncondi-
tionally of any purchase. Here, the purchase decision takes place after the trial 
period.  
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Chapter 2 
 
The Effects of Premium Promotions 
on Consumers’ Incidence, Choice, 
and Quantity Decisions 
2.  
Firms often use premium promotions–free gifts offered with products pur-
chased at their original prices, although academic research has not sufficiently 
studied their effects on consumers purchase decisions. To shed light on this 
relationship, we use data from an online shopping experiment and model a 
premium’s effects on consumers’ incidence, choice, and quantity decisions with 
a simultaneously estimated nested multinomial Logit model and a zero-
truncated Poisson model with unobserved consumer heterogeneity. The results 
are in line with our expectations that premiums increase the likelihood of cate-
gory purchases and induce brand switching, but leave consumers’ quantity 
decisions unaffected. The comparison of premium and price cut effects reveals 
that a price cut in general outperforms a premium promotion. However, two of 
three studied moderators improve a premium’s position and a simulation study 
illustrates that managers may prefer premiums depending on the pass-through 
rates.  
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2.1. Introduction 
A premium, or a product consumers receive for free with the purchase of an-
other product at its regular price (D'Astous and Jacob 2002), is a well-
established promotion regularly used by manufacturers in the marketplace. For 
example, McDonald’s, as well as many fast-moving consumer goods companies, 
including Henkel and Procter & Gamble, frequently give away premiums, such 
as free toys with the purchase of McDonald’s Happy Meals or free toy trucks 
with the purchase of washing powder. Because premiums are gifts to consum-
ers, they are expected to be perceived positively and as attractive. However, 
premium effects are not well understood. Extant literature suggests that care-
fully selected premiums can lead to favorable perceptions of the premium and 
the promoted product (D'Astous and Jacob 2002; D'Astous and Landreville 
2003; Shimp et al. 1976), but studies investigating the effect of premiums on 
sales report positive as well as negative effects and even no effect at all (e.g. 
Chandon et al. 2000; Gedenk et al. 2000; Simonson et al. 1994). Furthermore, it 
remains unclear when firms should choose a premium over a traditional price 
cut. Even when a premium and a price cut have the same perceived value to end 
consumers, their different nature may lead to different outcomes. We 
acknowledge a need for a more systematic analysis of premium effectiveness. 
Thus, we investigate the immediate effects of premium promotions on consum-
ers’ incidence, choice, and quantity decisions and compare this performance 
with that of price cuts. In addition, we analyze whether a premium’s perfor-
mance compared with that of a price cut is moderated by three crucial factors 
namely premium-product relatedness, brand type, and category type. Our re-
search adds to academic literature in three ways.  
 First, research on premium promotions has focused on consumers’ evalua-
tive responses (D'Astous and Jacob 2002; D'Astous and Landreville 2003; 
Shimp et al. 1976). The few studies that do investigate objective outcomes con-
centrate on brand choice or aggregate sales and neglect the quantity and inci-
dence decisions (e.g. Chandon et al. 2000; Gedenk et al. 2000; Gedenk et al. 
2010; Simonson et al. 1994). Thus, further research on all three decision levels 
is necessary because previous research reveals that a sales promotion may 
perform differently on the three decision levels (e.g. Foubert and Gijsbrechts 
2007; Van Heerde, Gupta, and Wittink 2003).  
 Second, we compare the performance of premium promotions on all three 
decision levels with that of price cuts and systematically ensure that the differ-
ent promotions have comparable perceived values. Although some studies in-
clude premiums as well as price cuts in their analyses, perceived values do not 
match, which impedes a direct comparison of the two promotion types (Chan-
don et al. 2000; Gedenk et al. 2000; Nunes and Park 2003).  
PREMIUM PROMOTIONS 
27 
 Third, research on sales promotions has identified several unique charac-
teristics of premiums (e.g. Nunes and Park 2003; Raghubir 2004), but it has not 
systematically manipulated these characteristics to understand their impact on 
relative premium effectiveness. We choose three important moderators: a 
product category’s degree of hedonism/utilitarianism, whether a product is a 
private label or national brand, and the degree of premium–product related-
ness. Doing so enables us to gain insights into how and when the promotions’ 
performances differ and the circumstances in which a premium can be used as 
an alternative to the popular price promotion. 
 This study is based on an online shopping experiment that simulated seven 
consecutive shopping trips during which participants were exposed to different 
promotions. The data set contains (fictitious) purchase decisions from 1930 
respondents who are responsible for grocery shopping in their household and 
regularly purchase in at least one of the four product categories: margarine, 
orange juice, milk, and cereals. We use a nested multinomial logit (MNL) model 
to model incidence and choice and a zero-truncated Poisson model to model 
purchase quantity. We estimate the two models simultaneously using simulated 
maximum likelihood estimation with quasi-random Halton draws in SAS/IML. 
To capture unobserved heterogeneity, the parameters are normally distributed 
across households. 
 The results show that premiums have a positive effect on consumers’ inci-
dence and choice decisions but tend to leave the quantity decision unaffected. 
In general, premiums perform worse than equivalent price cuts on all decision 
levels. However, a premium’s relative impact on choice and incidence increases 
if the premium comes with a private label rather than a national brand. This 
effect is strengthened in hedonic rather than utilitarian categories. Of interest, 
relatedness of the premium and the promoted product is not important. Alt-
hough the findings in general suggest that a price cut is better able to increase 
product sales than an equivalent premium, the comparison is more favorable 
for premiums when costs are taken into account. Because premiums may cost 
the manufacturer considerably less than price cuts, a premium promotion may 
be the preferred strategy, particularly in hedonic categories.  
 In the remainder of the chapter, we provide an overview of the literature 
and present the conceptual framework and hypotheses. Next, we describe the 
experimental design, explain how we model the premium effects, and discuss 
the results. Then, we use the estimated coefficients to conduct a simulation 
study and compare the impact of alternative price and premium promotions on 
brand sales. A discussion of the results and their theoretical and managerial 
implications concludes the chapter.  
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2.2. Contribution to the Literature 
This study investigates the effectiveness of premium promotions and contrib-
utes to the extant sales promotion literature in three ways: It (1) examines the 
effects of premium promotions on consumers’ incidence, choice, and quantity 
decisions; (2) compares these effects with those of traditional price cuts; and 
(3) investigates three moderators of the performance of premiums compared 
with price promotions. We next discuss these contributions in greater detail.  
2.2.1. Impact on Consumers’ Purchase Decisions 
Rather than focusing on objective purchase decisions, most studies on premium 
effectiveness measure consumers’ subjective evaluation of the promoted prod-
uct (e.g. Darke and Chung 2005; Low and Lichtenstein 1993; Palazón-Vidal and 
Delgado-Ballester 2005) or the promotional offer as a whole (product plus 
premium) (D'Astous and Jacob 2002). For example, research has shown that 
premiums improve brand preference for (Shimp et al. 1976) and attitudes to-
ward (Low and Lichtenstein 1993) the promoted product. Palazón-Vidal and 
Delgado-Ballester (2005) find that premiums generate more favorable associa-
tions with the promoted product, and Darke and Chung (2005) present evi-
dence that premiums increase the perceived value of an offer. 
 Although most research focuses on evaluative responses to premium pro-
motions, some studies have investigated consumers’ actual behavior. However, 
this research falls short in providing a thorough understanding of the possible 
purchase effects for three reasons. First, some studies have focused on consum-
ers’ actual choice but used rather artificial choice settings in which respondents 
chose from small choice sets of two to three items (Chandon et al. 2000; Gedenk 
et al. 2000; Simonson et al. 1994) or in which the premiums involved unattrac-
tive items (Simonson et al. 1994). This research has found both positive (Chan-
don et al. 2000) and negative (Gedenk et al. 2000; Simonson et al. 1994) effects 
of premium promotions on brand choice.  
Second, although field studies have investigated premium effectiveness, their 
focus is on only one product category and on aggregate sales (Esteban-Bravo, 
Múgica, and Vidal-Sanz 2009; Gedenk et al. 2010; Nunes and Park 2003; Pres-
ton, Dwyer, and Rudelius 1978). In addition, Esteban-Bravo et al. (2009) and 
Preston et al. (1978) do not state the promoted products’ sales but rather focus 
on sales of a non-promoted version and a comparison of promotionally and 
non-promotionally-acquired customers, respectively. Gedenk et al. (2010) and 
Nunes and Park (2003) merely report the promoted products’ average short-
term sales, which increase as a result of the premium.  
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 Third, choice represents only one step in the purchase process: Incidence 
and quantity decisions have been neglected. Because studies have focused on 
either choice or aggregate sales, how premiums perform at the individual pur-
chase level cannot be generalized. However, previous research has shown that 
a sales promotion can be highly effective on one decision level and ineffective 
on another (e.g. Foubert and Gijsbrechts 2007; Van Heerde et al. 2003). Given 
their characteristics, we expect this to be true for premium promotions as well. 
Premiums are considered hedonic items (Chandon et al. 2000) and as valuable 
gifts that hold some economic value (Gaeth et al. 1991; Gedenk et al. 2000), 
which makes them effective at the incidence and choice levels. At the quantity 
level, we expect lower premium effectiveness. Premiums must be carried and 
stored by the consumer after product purchase. These costs increase with addi-
tional units of a premium, whereas the hedonic experience does not increase. 
While the effect at the quantity level is questionable, it might be positive at the 
incidence and choice levels. Thus, this study contributes to existing literature 
by examining the effects of premium promotions at all three consumer pur-
chase decision levels in a more realistic purchase context than that in prior 
studies.  
2.2.2. Comparison with Price Cuts  
With the increase in competition, both manufacturers and retailers have 
searched for alternatives to price promotions. In response, marketing research-
ers have studied the purchase effects of these alternative promotional tech-
niques in comparison with price cuts. For example, research has shown that 
price cuts trigger stronger brand switching effects than either product features 
and displays (Kumar and Leone 1988) or charity promotions that promise a 
contribution to a social cause per unit sold (Arora and Henderson 2007). Com-
pared with coupons, price cuts yield stronger quantity and incidence accelera-
tion effects (Neslin, Henderson, and Quelch 1985). Other studies have identified 
promotion techniques that outperform regular price cuts. For example, Walters 
and Rinne (1986) find that sales are more strongly affected by double coupons 
than by price cuts. Furthermore, carefully designed bundle promotions can 
outperform price cuts because of their strong positive effects on consumers’ 
choice decisions (Foubert and Gijsbrechts 2007).  
 Surprisingly, no research to date has systematically pitted the purchase 
effects of premium promotions against those of equivalent price cuts. Although 
Nunes and Park (2003), Chandon et al. (2000), and Gedenk et al. (2000) include 
both premiums and price cuts in their analyses, they do not match the per-
ceived values of the promotions, which hinders a direct comparison. However, 
comparing these two types of promotions systematically is worthwhile because 
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premium characteristics generally trigger different mechanisms than price cuts. 
A premium promotion is a non-monetary promotion with predominantly he-
donic benefits (Chandon et al. 2000). Typically, a premium is free to consumers, 
and its monetary value is not communicated. Thus, consumers may perceive a 
premium’s value as higher than its actual cost (Gaeth et al. 1991). A price cut’s 
value is unambiguous, because it is clearly communicated. Mental accounting 
theory predicts that a premium, because of its non-monetary nature, is per-
ceived as a separate gain, while a price cut is integrated in the product’s price 
and is considered a decrease of loss (Nunes and Park 2003; Thaler 1985). 
Moreover, premium promotions might be more salient than price cuts because 
they involve some gift attached to a product, which catches consumers’ atten-
tion (Chandran and Morwitz 2006). Another consequence of the non-monetary 
nature of premiums is that they do not suffer from reference price effects to the 
same extent as price cuts do. A premium is perceived as a separate gain, which 
is not integrated in the product’s price and thus does not influence a consum-
er’s quality or deal value perceptions (Darke and Chung 2005). Thus, premiums 
might perform better than price cuts at the incidence and choice levels and 
might lead to increased short-term sales. However, a premium needs to be car-
ried, stored, and eventually disposed of, and its salience can lead to reactance 
and justification problems (Low and Lichtenstein 1993; Simonson et al. 1994). 
Therefore, premiums might be relatively less effective at the quantity level.  
 In this study, we examine the performance of premiums compared with 
that of price cuts while controlling for these promotions’ perceived value. From 
here on, we use the term “relative premium effectiveness” to refer to the effec-
tiveness of a premium relative to the corresponding price cut. 
2.2.3. Moderators of Relative Effectiveness 
Relative premium effectiveness should not be examined in isolation but hinges 
on several moderating factors. Extant research indicates that branding the 
premium (Raghubir 2004), stating a premium’s monetary value (D'Astous and 
Jacob 2002; Nunes and Park 2003; Raghubir 2004), varying the necessary pur-
chase quantity to receive the premium (D'Astous and Jacob 2002), and varying 
the promoted product’s price (Raghubir 2004) all affect consumers’ evaluations 
of the premium or the promotional offer as a whole. This study examines three 
factors that deserve specific attention because of their possible impact on the 
performance of premium promotions compared with that of price cuts: premi-
um-specific, product-specific, and category-specific factors. Because our selec-
tion of moderators includes variations within the two product-level categories 
and brands as well as variations of the premium, we are able to gain a compre-
hensive view of relative premium effectiveness.  
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First, the premium-specific variable is the premium’s relatedness to the pro-
moted product. We consider a premium and a product related if they can be 
used together in typical product usage situations (Gaeth et al. 1991; Martin and 
Stewart 2001). Previous promotional literature has recognized the importance 
of relatedness in consumer decision making. Kivetz (2005) observes that con-
sumers choose a reward that is related to the performed effort. Gaeth et al. 
(1991) find that a bundle of two related products is perceived more valuable as 
the sum of its parts, except if the main product is of high quality. Recently, 
Gedenk et al. (2010) report that the premium’s relatedness to the product de-
creases a premium’s effectiveness in enhancing short-term sales. However, they 
define relatedness differently: Using a magazine as the main product, they con-
sider an informational booklet a similar and a CD a dissimilar premium. Thus, 
the research to date has generated mixed results for the effects of relatedness 
and overall has not investigated how relatedness affects relative premium per-
formance.  
 Second, we investigate the impact of the product-specific moderator brand 
type: We distinguish between national brands and private labels. In general, a 
private label is lower priced and has lower perceived quality than national 
brands (Sethuraman, Srinivasan, and Kim 1999). Previous work has demon-
strated that consumers’ out-of-stock reactions (Schary and Christopher 1979) 
and sales promotion responses (Sprott and Shimp 2004) differ between private 
labels and national brands. In this study, we argue that the effectiveness of a 
premium relative to a price cut depends on whether the promoted product is a 
private label or a national brand, such that private label and national brand 
managers may have different interests in premium promotions.  
 The third moderator involves the product category’s degree of hedonism 
versus utilitarianism. Ample research has documented the importance of this 
factor throughout the consumer decision-making process (e.g. Dhar and 
Wertenbroch 2000; Okada 2005; Sloot, Verhoef, and Franses 2005). The pro-
motional literature also accounts for the effects of hedonism and utilitarianism. 
For example, Park and Mowen (2007) report that in a hedonic purchase situa-
tion, non-monetary promotions are more effective than monetary ones, while 
these promotions seem equally effective in a utilitarian purchase situation. 
Similarly, Chandon et al. (2000) find that in contrast with price cuts, premiums 
are more effective when offered with a hedonic rather than a utilitarian brand. 
Thus, although the moderating impact of hedonism/utilitarianism on the per-
formance of premiums has been addressed, we also include it in our study to 
obtain a more comprehensive overview of the promotions’ effects on purchase 
decisions. 
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2.3. Hypotheses and Conceptual Framework 
In this section, we develop hypotheses about the effects of premium promo-
tions on consumers’ purchase decisions and the role of three moderating varia-
bles on the performance of premiums compared with that of price cuts. To pro-
vide a more sound comparison of premium and price cuts, we consider promo-
tions whose economic value is perceived as equivalent by the average consum-
er. That is, we assume that the average consumer’s willingness to pay for the 
premium equals the price reduction.  
2.3.1. The Impact of Premium Promotions on Consumers’ Purchase 
Decisions 
In what follows, we develop hypotheses and expectations regarding the impact 
of premium promotions on incidence, choice, and quantity. We begin by dis-
cussing premium promotion effects at the incidence and choice levels and then 
continue with the quantity effects. We discuss the incidence and choice effects 
together because they are governed by the same principles (e.g. Bucklin and 
Gupta 1992; Bucklin and Lattin 1992). 
2.3.1.1. Choice and Incidence Effects  
We expect that premium promotions increase product and category attractive-
ness and base our argumentation on three principles. First and most obvious, 
consumers perceive premiums as having positive economic value (Gaeth et al. 
1991; Gedenk et al. 2000), such that offers that include a premium are consid-
ered of greater value than offers without. Second, premiums can serve as a 
simple heuristic to solve complex choice tasks. Brown and Carpenter (2000) 
find that trivial attributes that are unimportant to the functioning of the prod-
uct, such as product features, sweepstakes, or add-ons, can successfully distin-
guish a product from similar alternatives. Premiums can also be such attributes 
and thus work in a similar manner. Third, the mere hedonic experience of re-
ceiving a gift may appeal to consumers regardless of the premium’s economic 
value (Chandon et al. 2000). In a similar vein, the so-called zero-price effect 
suggests that an item (the premium in our case) is particularly attractive when 
it is for free (Shampanier et al. 2007).  
 Admittedly, the promotional literature offers some theories that imply 
negative premium effects on product and category attractiveness. Attribution 
theory holds that a prominent promotion, such as a premium, may lead con-
sumers to attribute their purchase to the promotion instead of the product 
itself and, as a consequence, make negative quality inferences about the prod-
uct (Blattberg and Neslin 1990). Furthermore, in line with reactance theory, 
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consumers may perceive a premium as a blunt manipulation that limits their 
choices and in response refrain from buying the promoted product (Brehm 
1966, 1989). Finally, according to justification theory, consumers may find it 
difficult to justify the purchase of products with premiums whose benefits may 
not always be clear (Brehm 1966; Gedenk et al. 2000; Simonson et al. 1994).  
 We recognize that some consumers may perceive a product with a premi-
um as unattractive, especially those who attach little or no value to the premi-
um (Simonson et al. 1994). However, because we study premiums whose aver-
age value is non-negligible (we match the premiums’ value with non-zero price 
discounts), we expect the premium’s impact on the incidence and choice prob-
abilities to be positive overall.  
H1: A premium promotion has a positive impact on consumers’ incidence 
and choice decisions. 
2.3.1.2. Quantity Effects  
Research shows that to fully reap the benefits of price cuts, consumers increase 
their purchase quantities; that is, they “accelerate” purchase (e.g. Ailawadi et al. 
2007; Bell, Chiang, and Padmanabhan 1999; Gupta 1988). We expect that this 
phenomenon is unlikely to occur with premium promotions, and we support 
our reasoning with several principles. First, premium promotions mainly offer 
hedonic benefits, and an additional unit of the premium does not necessarily 
increase a consumer’s hedonic experience (Chandon et al. 2000). Second, if 
extra units of a premium entail only carrying, storage, and disposal costs, con-
sumers may even decide to buy less than they would without the promotion, to 
avoid these costs (Gedenk et al. 2000). No or negative quantity effects can also 
occur when consumers apply social rather than market norms: That is, when a 
product is distributed for free, consumers are likely to take only one unit out of 
fairness (e.g. Heyman and Ariely 2004).  
 Such mechanisms imply that consumers are unlikely to accelerate in re-
sponse to premiums. Instead, we expect premiums to trigger no or even nega-
tive quantity effects. Because it is impossible to formally test this statement (it 
includes the null effect), we formulate only the following expectation:  
E1: A premium promotion has no or even a negative impact on consumers’ 
quantity decisions. 
2.3.2. Moderators of Relative Premium Effectiveness 
As argued previously, to compare premiums with equivalent price cuts, the 
moderating role of premium-, product-, and category-related factors should be 
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taken into account. More specifically, we examine the impact of three modera-
tors - namely, premium–product relatedness, private label versus national 
brands, and the category’s degree of hedonism/utilitarianism.  
2.3.2.1. Premium–Product Relatedness  
Consumers display a greater willingness to pay for related than non-related 
items (Venkatesh and Kamakura 2003). Thus, the premium’s relatedness to the 
product increases the value consumers attach to the combined offer, a principle 
that may influence premium effectiveness at all decision levels. In addition, at 
the incidence and choice levels, a premium’s role as a heuristic that facilitates 
decision making may be more prominent when it is related rather than unrelat-
ed to the promoted product. Indeed, Brown and Carpenter (2000) demonstrate 
that trivial attributes are more likely to induce an increase in choice probability 
if they are product related, such as product features, rather than unrelated, 
such as sweepstakes or add-ons. Relatedness between the premium and the 
product also may temper any negative attribution, reactance, or justification 
effects (e.g. Aaker and Keller 1990; Kivetz 2005; Martin and Stewart 2001). In 
other words, consumers are less likely to perceive a related premium as ma-
nipulative, which helps them justify the purchase. Thus, we hypothesize that 
relatedness between a premium and the main product strengthens the premi-
um’s performance relative to price cuts at the incidence, choice, and quantity 
levels.  
H2a: At the incidence and choice levels, relatedness has a positive impact on 
a premium promotion’s relative performance.  
H2b: At the quantity level, relatedness has a positive impact on a premium 
promotion’s relative performance.  
2.3.2.2. Private Label versus National Brand 
Although sales promotions can be more effective for national brands than for 
private labels for many reasons, other principles imply the opposite. On the one 
hand, because of their strong brand image, national brands can better resist 
negative inference effects when consumers treat sales promotions as signals of 
low quality (Raghubir and Corfman 1999). On the other hand, because private 
labels focus on affordability (Ailawadi, Neslin, and Gedenk 2001), they arguably 
have less to lose from negative quality inferences than national brands.  
 Although these arguments are relevant for both premiums and price cuts, 
one principle holds in particular for price promotions and less for premiums—
namely, asymmetric switching. Research shows that price cuts for national 
brands induce more switching than price cuts for private labels (e.g. Blattberg 
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and Wisniewski 1989; Sethuraman et al. 1999; Sivakumar and Raj 1997). That 
is, a lower price makes national brands affordable to price-sensitive consumers, 
who otherwise purchase the cheaper private labels. In contrast, a price cut for 
the private label does not lead to the same amount of consumer switching be-
cause many buyers of national brands do not want to give up quality to switch 
to the discounted private label.  
 Unlike price cuts, premium promotions do not offer a monetary incentive 
and therefore are less likely to make national brands attractive to price-
sensitive consumers. As a result, in the shift from a private label to a national 
brand, premium promotions do not benefit to the same extent from asymmetric 
switching, and thus their relative effectiveness decreases.  
H3: At the incidence and choice levels, the relative performance level of 
premium promotions is lower for national brands than for private la-
bels.  
By definition, asymmetric switching does not affect a consumer’s quantity deci-
sion. Furthermore, extant literature does not provide any other principles that 
suggest that brand type moderates the relative performance of premiums at the 
quantity level. Therefore, we leave this as an empirical question. 
2.3.2.3. Hedonism/Utilitarianism  
Chandon et al.’s (2000) benefit congruency framework predicts that consumers 
prefer promotions that offer similar benefits as the underlying product. Thus, 
price cuts, which mainly offer utilitarian benefits, should have relatively 
stronger choice effects in utilitarian categories, whereas premiums, which 
mainly provide hedonic benefits, should be relatively more effective in hedonic 
categories. However, Chandon et al. can validate their framework only for high-
equity brands: High-equity brands offer stronger utilitarian and hedonic bene-
fits than low-equity brands, which are mainly bought for their low price.  
 These findings regarding the role of hedonism and utilitarianism enable us 
to fine-tune our expectations of the impact of private labels and national 
brands. Specifically, we expect that the decrease in a premium’s relative per-
formance when moving from a private label to a national brand (see H3) is 
more pronounced for utilitarian than for hedonic product categories. In hedon-
ic categories, the benefit congruency effect mitigates the decrease in relative 
premium performance in the switch from a private label to a national brand. In 
contrast, in utilitarian categories, the congruency effect reinforces the relative 
performance of price cuts for national brands. 
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H4: At the incidence and choice levels, the decrease in relative premium 
effectiveness in the switch from a private label to a national brand is 
greater in utilitarian than in hedonic product categories. 
Again, we do not formulate any hypothesis for the effects at the quantity level: 
H3, of which H4 is a refinement, only pertains to the incidence and choice lev-
els, and Chandon et al. (2000) developed their framework to explain switching 
patterns. Nonetheless, we also empirically explore the role of hedonism versus 
utilitarianism at the quantity level. 
2.4. Experimental Design and Data Collection 
The data for this study were collected through an online purchase experiment 
in which we replicated a realistic shopping environment. Respondents, all 
members of a research panel in a Western European country, made fictitious 
purchases in different hedonic and utilitarian product categories with varying 
promotions during a seven-week period. Evidence indicates that computer-
simulated shopping experiments provide highly realistic buying behavior data, 
especially when decision cues mimic those of a real store environment (Burke 
et al. 1992). Moreover, shopping experiments enable the researcher to increase 
the variance of the explanatory variables and investigate less common scenari-
os. In this study, we manipulate four factors: the premium’s relatedness to the 
product category (related/unrelated), the category’s level of hedonism and 
utilitarianism (hedonic/utilitarian), the type of brand on promotion (national 
brand/private label), and the depth of price cuts (low/medium/high). The lat-
ter manipulation enables us to estimate a linear discount effect and compare 
the premium impact with that of equivalent and non-equivalent discounts.  
 Subsequently, we discuss the results of the pre-tests and manipulation 
checks conducted to determine the product categories, assortment composi-
tion, premiums, price-cut levels, and brands on promotion. Furthermore, we 
address the survey design and the experimental setup. 
2.4.1. Selection of Product Categories 
We generated an initial list of hedonic and utilitarian product categories on the 
basis of previous research (e.g. Breugelmans, Campo, and Gijsbrechts 2006; 
Campo 1997) and used up-to-date consumer purchase data from GFK to nar-
row the selection down to four categories with sufficiently high penetration. 
We retained two utilitarian categories (i.e. milk and margarine) and two hedon-
ic categories (i.e. orange juice and cereals). At the end of the main study, we 
PREMIUM PROMOTIONS 
37 
asked respondents how utilitarian and hedonic they perceived the product 
categories on a two-item six-point Likert scale adopted from Okada (2005). 
Table 2.1 displays the means and standard deviations of these items. Independ-
ent t-tests1 revealed that respondents perceived orange juice and cereals as 
significantly (p < .01) more hedonic and milk and margarine as significantly (p 
< .0005) more utilitarian (see Table 2.1).  
Table 2.1 Descriptive Statistics for Utilitarianism and Hedonism Measures 
Category Mean Standard Deviation 
Utilitarianism 
Milk 5.36a  .95 
Margarine 4.79a 1.16 
Orange juice 4.44a 1.21 
Cereals 4.31a 1.20 
Hedonism 
Cereals 3.55b 1.43 
Orange juice 3.26b 1.48 
Milk 2.56b 1.50 
Margarine 2.19b 1.34 
a All means differ at p < .05 
b All means differ at p < .05 
2.4.2. Selection of Assortment and Promoted Brands 
To ensure that the simulated shopping trips appeared realistic and allowed 
respondents to behave as they normally do, we composed assortments that 
represented a high market share in the respective categories (see Table 2.2). 
With the GFK market share data, we generated assortments of the most popular 
stock-keeping units (SKUs) and selected the most prominent package size per 
category (see Table 2.2, third column) while ensuring that the brand lines did 
not appear incomplete or unbalanced. The chosen SKUs either were national 
brand SKUs or belonged to the house brand of a major supermarket chain.2  
The regular prices of the national brand items in the assortment were deter-
mined as rounded averages of non-promoted prices in three major supermar-
ket chains in the studied country. The regular prices of the private label items 
                                                                  
1 Respondents evaluated only the categories in which they made purchases during the shopping 
simulation. As a result, for a given pair of product categories, some respondents evaluated both 
categories and some evaluated only one category. We conducted independent t-tests and, for each 
pair of categories, disregarded respondents who assessed both categories.  
2 In 2008, the chain had a market share of 25.1% in the studied country Delhaize Group (2009), 
"Annual Report 2008," http://www.delhaizegroup.com/Portals/0/html/AnnualReport/2008/-
html%20nl/index.htm. 
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were based only on prices in the relevant supermarket chain. We selected two 
sets of items in each category that were promoted alternately during the exper-
iment. The first set contained SKUs of a major national brand, and the second 
consisted of private label SKUs. The sets matched in number of items and prod-
uct characteristics. A manipulation check at the end of the main study indicated 
that in all categories, respondents perceived the private label as of significantly 
lower quality than the national brand (p < .0001, see Table 2.3).  
Table 2.2 Information about Product Assortments 
Category Market Share  Assortment (%) 
Total Nr 
of Items 
Package  
Size 
Nr of Items in  
Promotional Sets 
Orange juice  83 10 1 l 2 
Cereals  93 42 500 g 3 
Margarine  98 18 250 g 2 
Milk  75 18 1 l 3 
 
Table 2.3 Perceived Quality Scores 
Category 
Private Label National Brand 
Meana Standard  Deviation Meana 
Standard 
Deviation 
Orange juiceb 3.27 1.48 4.44 1.21 
Cerealsb 3.55 1.43 4.31 1.20 
Margarineb 2.19 1.34 4.80 1.16 
Milkb 2.56 1.48 5.36  .95 
a Measured on a seven-point scale . 
b Difference is significant at p < .0001. 
2.4.3. Selection of Premiums  
In view of our hypotheses, we need to select related and unrelated premiums 
for each product category. Furthermore, to be able to compare premium effects 
with those of price cuts, we need to match the values of both promotions. 
Therefore, we proceeded as follows: We generated an extensive list of possible 
(related and unrelated) premiums. Respondents in a first pre-test saw pictures 
and read brief descriptions of these different premiums and then indicated how 
much they would maximally pay for each product if they found it on the shelves 
of their regular supermarket. We chose willingness to pay because we wanted 
to obtain consumers’ subjective evaluations of the product in a specified situa-
tion (Ajzen and Driver 1992; Wertenbroch and Skiera 2002). The sample con-
sisted of 175 consumers who were reached online through snowball sampling 
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and had a similar socio-demographic profile to that of the participants in the 
main study. We discarded premiums with an excessively high or low average 
perceived value as well as premiums that showed a large variance in perceived 
value. In the second pre-test, 219 randomly selected members of an online 
research panel at the university of one of the authors rated the retained premi-
ums’ relatedness to the four product categories on a seven-point scale adapted 
from Martin and Stewart (2001). For each category, we selected one clearly 
related and one clearly unrelated premium with similar perceived values. Table 
3.4 provides an overview of the selected premiums and their average perceived 
values and relatedness scores. According to the scores, the related premium 
was always significantly (p < .0001, see Table 2.4) more related than the unre-
lated premium.  
Table 2.4 Selection of Premium Promotions 
Category Related Premium Average Perceived  Value (€) 
Relatednessa 
Unrelated Premium Mean Scoreb 
Orange juice Glass .40 6.33 
Keychain .35 1.76 
Cereals Bowl .62 6.44 
Key tag .62 2.16 
Margarine Spreading knife .59 6.14 
Pen .55 1.86 
Milk Carton/bottle holder .29 5.15 
Set of red magnets .28 2.14 
a Difference between mean scores of related and unrelated premium is always significant at  
p < .0001. 
b Measured on a seven-point scale. 
2.4.4. Determination of Price Cuts  
Because this study compares the effects of premiums with those of equivalent 
price cuts, we needed to ensure that the perceived premium value falls in the 
range of possible price cuts. For each category, we determined three absolute 
price-cut levels, one of which, usually the middle one, approximated the premi-
ums’ perceived value. We derived the other two levels by adding or subtracting 
an amount approximately equal to 10% of the average regular price in the cate-
gory.3 The last three columns of Table 2.5 list the price-cut levels for all four 
                                                                  
3 Only for margarine, it is the highest (rather than medium) price cut that corresponds to the pre-
miums’ perceived value. In that category, the perceived premium value is already high relative to 
the regular price of the private label, such that an even higher price cut would seem unrealistic. We 
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categories. In the shopping experiment, price cuts were always presented as 
absolute amounts.  
Table 2.5 Price-Cut Levels 
Category Average SKU Price (€) Price Cut (€) Low Medium High 
Orange juice 1.50 .20 .35 .50 
Cereals 3.25 .30 .60 .90 
Margarine 2.09 .15 .35 .55 
Milk 1.11 .15 .25 .35 
2.4.5. Survey Design  
The online survey consisted of three parts: the initialization stage, the actual 
purchase simulation, and a concluding section. The purpose of the initialization 
stage was to screen respondents and gather the data needed to generate an 
individualized questionnaire. To qualify, respondents needed to be actively 
involved in buying groceries for their household and to regularly shop in at 
least one of the four selected product categories. If these pre-requisites were 
met, we assigned respondents to at least one and at most two product catego-
ries. Whenever a respondent indicated to regularly shop in more than two 
product categories, we assigned him or her to one hedonic and one utilitarian 
category. Respondents then provided more detailed information about their 
consumption behavior in the product categories to which they were assigned 
(see Appendix A1 for a list of scales). The consumption information collected in 
the initialization phase contained usual package size consumed, average weekly 
consumption, and number of open and closed packages currently in stock. The 
information on usual package size and packages in stock helped us calculate a 
respondent’s initial volume in stock. We used average weekly consumption to 
update the respondent’s inventory during the shopping simulation. The simula-
tion covered a fictitious period of seven consecutive weeks during which the 
respondent purchased in at most two product categories. Figures 2.1 and 2.2 
represent screenshots of two shopping situations with a price cut and a premi-
um, respectively. 
 
  
                                                                                                                                                           
took 10% and 20% of the average regular price and subtracted these amounts from the high price 
cut to find the medium and low price cuts, respectively.  
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Figure 2.1 Example Screenshot of a Price Cut 
 
Figure 2.2 Example Screenshot of a Premium Promotion 
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We considered the first week a warm-up week during which respondents got 
acquainted with the shopping experiment and excluded it from our analysis. As 
in actual purchase situations, the respondent was not obliged to buy. In the 
beginning of each shopping week, we showed respondents their current inven-
tory. We calculated this inventory by adding the purchase quantity in the previ-
ous week to each respondent’s previous inventory and subtracting average 
weekly consumption. Next, we provided instructions on how to proceed with 
the purchase simulation, followed by a planogram with pictures of the brands 
making up the assortment. The product’s price appeared below each picture. 
Respondents could receive more information by holding the mouse on the pic-
ture, which opened up a pop-up window with further details on the product’s 
brand name, form, flavor, and size. In the boxes below the products, consumers 
indicated their purchase quantity, if non-zero. 
 In the weeks in which products were on promotion, we displayed a promo-
tional banner above the assortment to reflect the realistic shopping environ-
ment in which promotions are typically accompanied by displays. Again, a pop-
up window with additional information about the promotion opened up when 
respondents held the mouse on the banner. At the same time, we attached a 
promotional sign to the pictures of promoted products.  
 We used a full factorial design to study the effects of the different promo-
tions. During the seven-week simulation, we selected one promotion-free week 
per category, and we alternately attached a promotion to either the national 
brand or the private label SKUs during the remaining six weeks. Respondents 
saw neither the same promotion nor the same promoted SKUs in consecutive 
weeks. We also varied the order of the promotions across respondents to avoid 
order effects. 
In the last part of the survey, we collected information on respondents’ usual 
purchase behavior and socio-demographics and included two manipulation 
checks. The questions on usual purchase behavior covered average purchase 
frequency, usual purchase quantity, and choice shares of the different SKUs 
during the last 12 months. We asked these questions after the shopping simula-
tion to avoid interference with the respondents’ fictitious purchase decisions. 
The socio-demographics included gender, age, nationality, family situation, 
number and age of children, education, and profession. Finally, for each catego-
ry in which they purchased during the simulation, respondents evaluated the 
perceived quality of the promoted national and private label brands and the 
category’s level of hedonism and utilitarianism. The results of these manipula-
tion checks were provided previously. 
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2.4.6. Sample Characteristics 
A cooperating marketing research company sent approximately 11,700 ran-
domly selected members of its research panel an invitation to participate in our 
online experiment. Of these, 2,468 panelists (approximately 21%) completed 
the survey. We removed consumers who were not (entirely or partly) respon-
sible for their household’s grocery purchases or did not usually buy in any of 
the four product categories. After also deleting respondents with inconsistent 
or implausible answers, we retained a sample of 1,930 consumers. Table 2.6 
summarizes the distribution of the final sample over the socio-demographic 
characteristics. In their study on stock-out reactions, Sloot et al. (2005) use a 
sample with similar characteristics they view as representative of Western 
European shoppers.  
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Table 2.6 Sample Demographics 
Variable Levels Percentage (%) 
Gender Male 20 
Female 80 
Age ≤18 years  1 
19–25 years  7 
26–35 years 22 
36–45 years 24 
46–55 years 22 
56–65 years 20 
≥66  4 
Family situation Living with parents  3 
Single 16 
Widow  3 
Married 53 
Living together 20 
Divorced  4 
Other  1 
Children Yes 48 
No 52 
Children in certain age groups  
(children = yes) 
<3 years 14 
3–6 years 16 
7–14 years 26 
15–18 years 16 
>18 years 28 
Highest level of education Primary school  4 
Secundary school 36 
College, short type 34 
College, long type 13 
University 12 
Other  1 
Profession Student  4 
Homemaker  9 
Part-time worker 19 
Full-time worker 45 
Unemployed  4 
Retired 15 
Other  4 
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Table 2.7 lists for each category the number of households, purchase occasion, 
average number of purchase incidences, and average purchase quantity. In the 
final sample, 974 households shopped in the orange juice category, 671 in the 
cereals category, 898 in the margarine category, and 1,175 in the milk category. 
These households purchased on average 3.52, 3.99, 2.83, and 3.62 times in the 
orange juice, cereals, margarine, and milk category, respectively. The average 
purchase quantity varies largely from 17.31 units of milk to 4.14 units of mar-
garine and from 10.19 units of orange juice to 4.64 units of cereals, which is a 
result of the products’ differing storability.  
Table 2.7 Description of Data 
Category Number of House-holds (HH) 
Purchase 
Occasions 
Average Number of 
Incidences (per HH) 
Average Purchase 
Quantity (per HH) 
Orange juice   974 6122 3.52 10.19 
Cereals   671 4819 3.99  4.64 
Margarine   898 5600 2.83  4.14 
Milk  1175 7359 3.62 17.31 
 
As a first tentative impression of the promotions’ effects, Table 2.8 presents the 
choice shares of the national brand and the private label in the weeks in which 
a premium, a price cut, or no promotion was offered. The results indicate that 
premiums and price cuts strongly increase the choice shares of the promoted 
brands. Table 2.9 lists the category purchase incidences as shares of the total 
number of shopping trips in the weeks in which a premium, a price cut, or no 
promotion was offered. Higher incidence shares occur in the weeks with price 
cuts than in the weeks without a promotion. A premium increases incidence 
shares only when it is attached to a private label. Table 2.10 summarizes the 
average purchase quantities per household within the four product categories 
when a premium, a price cut, or no promotion was offered for a national brand 
or a private label. In general, the average units purchased within a category 
increase from no-promotion to price-cut scenarios. However, the numbers sug-
gest that premiums do not increase, but rather decrease, quantity if national 
brands are on promotion. When premiums are offered with private labels, the 
average quantity purchased slightly increases.  
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Table 2.8 Choice Shares (%) with and without Promotions 
Category National Brand Private Label Premium Price Cut No Promotion Premium Price Cut No Promotion 
Orange juice 41.61 61.10 28.60 40.82 53.58 23.99 
Cereals 27.52 28.04 13.00 14.29 18.17  5.67 
Margarine 32.89 43.64 18.68 24.80 27.36 11.84 
Milk 47.62 69.18 30.00 50.71 57.51 41.17 
 
Table 2.9 Category Purchase Incidences (%) with and without Promotions 
Category National Brand Private Label No Promotion Premium Price Cut Premium Price Cut 
Orange juice  57.38 57.79 55.19 56.60 53.14 
Cereals  56.90 57.97 54.58 54.73 52.81 
Margarine  51.02 49.78 44.79 42.66 41.08 
Milk  60.60 59.96 57.85 59.50 49.42 
 
Table 2.10 Average Purchase Quantities (Units) with and without Promotions 
Category National Brand Private Label No Promotion Premium Price Cut Premium Price Cut 
Orange juice  1.29 2.31 1.92 3.10 1.57 
Cereals   .65  .99  .91 1.38  .72 
Margarine  .56 1  .79 1.18  .60 
Milk 2.36 3.50 3.30 5.84 2.32 
2.5. Model Description 
We formulate a joint model for the three consumer purchase decisions—
incidence, choice, and quantity—in which choice is conditional on incidence 
and quantity on choice (Bell et al. 1999; Chiang 1991; Zhang and Krishnamurthi 
2004; e.g Zhang and Wedel 2009). The probability that consumer h buys q units 
of SKU i on shopping trip t can be expressed as 
P୲୦(i & ݍ) = P୲୦(inc) ∗  P୲୦(i|inc) ∗  P୲୦(q|inc & ݅), (1) 
where 
ࡼ࢚ࢎ(࢏࢔ࢉ) = the probability that consumer h purchases in the category on shop-
ping trip t, 
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ࡼ࢚ࢎ(࢏|࢏࢔ࢉ) = the probability that consumer h purchases SKU i on shopping trip t 
conditional on buying in the category, and  
ࡼ࢚ࢎ(ࢗ|࢏࢔ࢉ & ࢏) = consumer h’s probability of buying quantity q on shopping trip 
t conditional on buying SKU i. 
In what follows, we first discuss the modeling approaches for the incidence, 
choice, and quantity decisions and then explain the estimation procedure.  
2.5.1. Incidence and Choice Decisions 
We model the probability of buying SKU i on shopping trip t with a nested MNL 
model. This model incorporates the interdependence of the decision to buy in a 
category (incidence) and the decision to purchase a particular SKU (choice). 
Next, we first discuss the consumer’s utility function and then derive the model 
formulation of the nested MNL model.  
 The decision to purchase a certain SKU is conditional on buying in the cate-
gory. Thus, the utility a consumer h receives from buying SKU i involves utilities 
at the category level ࢁ࢚ࢎ and utilities specific to the SKU ࢆ࢏࢚ࢎ . The utility consum-
er h receives from purchasing in a category, ࢁ࢚ࢎ , is a function of the observed 
utility ࢃ࢚ࢎ, which is a linear function of observed variables, and an unobserved 
portion ࢿ࢚ࢎ , which is treated as random from the researcher’s perspective.  
U୲୦ = W୲୦ + ε୲୦. (2) 
where ࢿ࢚ࢎ are independent and follow the same type I extreme value distribu-
tion (Train 2002). The observed utility function is as follows: 
W୲୦ = τ଴ + τ୍୬୴ × Inv୲୦ + τ୍୔ୈ୙ୖ × IPDUR୲୦, (3) 
where ࡵ࢔࢚࢜ࢎ represents consumer h’s mean-centered inventory on shopping 
trip t. We compute a consumer’s inventory in the following manner: Max (0, 
inventory at shopping trip t – 1 + quantity bought at shopping trip t – 1 – con-
sumer’s average weekly consumption). We then mean-center the weekly inven-
tory values using a consumer’s average inventory. The next variable is the in-
ter-purchase duration, ࡵࡼࡰࢁࡾ࢚ࢎ ,  which is the average number of weeks be-
tween two consecutive purchase incidences of consumer h. 
 We again divide the utility ࢆ࢏࢚ࢎ  that a consumer derives from purchasing a 
particular SKU in a product category into an observed part ࢂ࢏࢚ࢎ  and an unob-
served portion ࢿ࢏࢚ࢎ . 
Z୧୲୦ = V୧୲୦ + ε୧୲୦ , (4) 
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 where ࢿ࢏࢚ࢎ  are again independent and type I extreme value distributed. The 
choice utility ࢂ࢏࢚ࢎ  is a linear function:    
V୧୲୦ =  ∑ ∑ β୏,୪୪ ∈୐ే୏  × AT୏,୪,୧ + β୐୭୷ × Loy୧୦ + β୐୆ × LB୧୲୦ + β୔୰ୣ୫ ×  Prem୧୲୦ +
βୖୣ୪୔୰ୣ୫ × RelPrem୧୲୦ + β୔୰ୣ୫୒୆ × PremNB୧୲୦ + β୔େ ×   PC୧୲୦ + βୈ୍ୗେ ×
DISC୧୲୦ + β୔େୈ୒୆ × PCNB୧୲୦ . (5) 
To capture intrinsic SKU preferences, we include several attribute-specific con-
stants in the choice utility function (e.g. Breugelmans, Campo, and Gijsbrechts 
2007; Foubert and Gijsbrechts 2007). For each attribute K, there is a set of lev-
els L୏. The dummy variable ࡭ࢀࡷ,࢒,࢏ takes the value of 1 if SKU i is characterized 
by level l of attribute K and 0 if otherwise. We also include a loyalty 
ble ࡸ࢕࢟࢏ࢎ, which represents consumer h’s self-stated overall choice share for 
SKU I in the 12 months before the study, and a purchase-feedback dummy vari-
able ࡸ࡮࢏࢚ࢎ , which equals 1 if consumer h bought the same SKU on the last pur-
chase incidence. 
 Three variables capture the effects of a premium promotion on an SKU’s 
utility. The first is ࡼ࢘ࢋ࢓࢏࢚ࢎ , which is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 
when a premium is offered for SKU i in week t and 0 if otherwise. Its coefficient 
represents the effect of an unrelated premium on the utility of a store brand. To 
capture the incremental effect of a premium for a national brand, we include 
ࡼ࢘ࢋ࢓ࡺ࡮࢏࢚ࢎ , which equals 1 if the premium is offered with an SKU that belongs 
to a national brand and 0 if otherwise. Its coefficient represents the change in 
utility if a premium comes with a national rather than a store brand. Finally, 
ࡾࢋ࢒ࡼ࢘ࢋ࢓࢏࢚ࢎ  is a dummy variable that indicates whether the premium is related 
to the category and thus represents the incremental effect of a related premium 
compared with an unrelated premium.  
 To account for the influence of price cuts, we incorporate three variables in 
the utility function. The dummy variable ࡼ࡯࢏࢚ is 1 whenever a price cut is of-
fered, and ࡰࡵࡿ࡯࢏࢚ࢎ  takes on the absolute values of the price cuts in euros. So, in 
addition to a linear discount effect, we include a constant feature effect; these 
effects pertain to store brands. We use the dummy variable ࡼ࡯ࡺ࡮࢏࢚ࢎ  to capture 
the incremental effect of a price cut on a national rather than a store brand. 
Similar to ࡼ࢘ࢋ࢓ࡺ࡮࢏࢚ࢎ  this variable equals 1 when the price cut applies to an 
SKU that belongs to a national brand.  
 Given the expressions for ࢁ࢚ࢎ and ࢆ࢏࢚ࢎ  and the distributions of the error 
terms, we can show that the probability of consumer h choosing SKU I on shop-
ping trip t can be split into two components: 
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P୲୦(i) = P୲୦(inc) ∗ P୲୦(i|inc) (6) 
where ࡼ࢚ࢎ(࢏࢔ࢉ) represents the incidence probability (i.e. the probability that 
consumer h purchases in the category on shopping trip t) and ࡼ࢚ࢎ(࢏|࢏࢔ࢉ) is the 
probability that consumer h buys SKU i on shopping trip t, given that the con-
sumer purchases in the category. In addition, ࡼ࢚ࢎ(࢏࢔ࢉ) is a binary logit model, 
and ࡼ࢚ࢎ(࢏|࢏࢔ࢉ) is an MNL model:  
P୲୦(inc) =
ୣ୶୮ቀ୛౪౞ାத౅౒∗୍୚౪౞ቁ
ଵାୣ୶୮൫୛౪౞ାத౅౒∗୍୚౪౞൯
 (7) 
P୲୦(i|inc) =
ୣ୶୮ቀ୚౟౪౞ ቁ
∑ ୣ୶୮ቀ୚ౠ౪౞ ቁౠ
, (8) 
where ࡵࢂ࢚ࢎ is the inclusive value for consumer h on shopping trip t and captures 
the attractiveness of the category assortment. We derived this inclusive value 
by taking the logarithm of the denominator of the choice model:  
IV୲୦ = log൫∑ exp൫V୨୲୦൯୨ ൯. (9) 
The term ࣎ࡵࢂ is the so-called scale parameter, which measures the extent to 
which the attractiveness of the SKUs affects the customer’s decision of whether 
to buy in the category.  
2.5.2. Quantity Decision 
The decision of how many units of SKU i to buy on shopping trip t is conditional 
on SKU i being chosen. Therefore, we model the probability that consumer h 
purchases quantity q of SKU i, ࡼ࢚ࢎ(ࢗ|࢏࢔ࢉ & ࢏), with a zero-truncated Poisson 
model (e.g. Ailawadi et al. 2007; Foubert and Gijsbrechts 2007):  
P୲୦(q|inc & ݅) =
ୣ୶୮ቀି஛౟౪౞ ቁቀ஛౟౪౞ ቁ
౧౟౪౞
୯౟౪౞ ! ൬ଵିୣ୶୮ቀି஛౟౪౞ ቁ൰
, (10) 
where ૃܑܜܐ  is the purchase rate for which we use an exponential function to en-
sure that ૃܑܜܐ  is always positive:  
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λ୧୲୦ = exp൫γ଴ + γ୐୭୷ × Loy୧୦ + γ୍୬୴ × Inv୲୦ + γ୅୴୯୳ୟ୬ × Avquan୦ + γ୔୰ୣ୫ ×
          Prem୧୲୦ + γୖୣ୪୔୰ୣ୫ × RelPrem୧୲୦ + γ୮୰ୣ୫୒୆ × premNB୧୲୦ + γ୔େ × PC୧୲୦ +
          γୈ୍ୗେ × DISC୧୲୦ + γ୔େୈ୒୆ × PCNB୧୲୦ ൯, (11) 
where ࡭࢛࢜ࢗࢇ࢔ࢎ represents consumer h’s self-stated average purchase quanti-
ty and ࡸ࢕࢟࢏ࢎ, as previously, reflects consumer h’s overall choice share for SKU i. 
Together, ࡭࢛࢜ࢗࢇ࢔ࢎ and ࡸ࢕࢟࢏ࢎ capture observed differences in the ‘baseline’ 
purchase quantity across consumers and/or SKUs. As in the incidence model, 
we include ࡵ࢔࢚࢜ࢎ to account for the cross-time fluctuations in the consumer’s 
inventory level. Finally, we use the same variables as previously to assess the 
promotion effects on the quantity decision. 
2.5.3. Estimation 
To capture unobserved heterogeneity, the parameters of our model are normal-
ly distributed parameters across households (Park and Gupta 2009; Roy, 
Chintagunta, and Haldar 1996; Train 2003). Therefore, the likelihood function 
that results from combining the three models explained previously does not 
have a closed form. Thus, we estimate the three consumer decisions of inci-
dence, choice, and quantity simultaneously using simulated maximum likeli-
hood with quasi-random Halton draws. The use of Halton sequences to esti-
mate the parameters’ means and standard deviations leads to better coverage, 
lower root mean square errors (Sándor and Train 2004; Train 2003), and a 
lower number of draws needed (Bhat 2001) and thus outperforms independent 
random draws. In this study, we draw 100 values for each coefficient and re-
spondent (McFadden and Train 2000; Revelt and Train 1998).  
 Accordingly, the simulated log-likelihood function to be optimized is as 
follows: 
SLL =  ∑ ln ቆଵୖ ∑ ቆ∏ ቊቆቀP୲୰୦(inc)ቁ
୷౪౞ × ቀ1 − P୲୰୦(inc)ቁ
ቀଵି୷౪౞ቁቇ  ×୲୰୦
∏  ቆቀP୲୰୦(i|inc)ቁ
୷౟౪౞ × ቀP୲୰୦(q|inc & ݅)ቁ
୷౟౪౞ ቇ୧ ቋቇቇ  (12) 
where 
ࡾ = the number of draws, 
ࡼ࢚࢘ࢎ (࢏࢔ࢉ) = the probability for the rth draw of parameters that consumer h pur-
chases in the category on shopping trip t, 
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࢚࢟ࢎ = the category purchase indicator (1 if consumer h purchases in the category 
on shopping trip t and 0 if otherwise), 
ࡼ࢚࢘ࢎ (࢏|࢏࢔ࢉ) = the probability for the rth draw of parameters that consumer h 
purchases SKU i on shopping trip t conditional on buying in the category, 
࢟࢏࢚ࢎ  = the SKU purchase indicator (1 if consumer h purchases SKU i on shopping 
trip t and 0 if otherwise), and 
ࡼ࢚࢘ࢎ (ࢗ|࢏࢔ࢉ & ࢏) = consumer h’s probability of buying quantity q on shopping trip 
t conditional on buying SKU i for the rth draw of parameters. 
We performed all estimations and computations with SAS/IML.  
2.6. Results 
In this section, we report the results of our model estimation and hypotheses 
tests. We discuss the parameter estimates of the control variables and attrib-
ute-specific intercepts and proceed with the assessment of the absolute impact 
of premium promotions on consumers’ purchase decisions (H1, E1) and the 
moderators of premium effectiveness relative to price cuts (H2–H4).  
2.6.1.  Control Variables and Attribute-Specific Intercepts 
2.6.1.1. Choice and Incidence 
Tables 2.11 and 2.12 display the parameter estimates of our simultaneously 
estimated mixed nested MNL and truncated Poisson models. For each parame-
ter’s distribution, we report the population mean, the standard deviation, and 
the corresponding standard errors. We first discuss the estimates for the at-
tribute-specific intercepts at the choice level, which appear in Table 2.11. For 
each attribute, we determine one reference level that is excluded in the analysis 
and constitutes the benchmark for the remaining levels of the same attribute. 
The baseline of a specific SKU corresponds to the sum of the parameter esti-
mates of the attribute levels describing the SKU. As the brand intercepts (see 
Table 2.11) of the promoted brands show, in the orange juice category the na-
tional brand (benchmark level) and the private label (MPLOJ = .05, p > .7) are 
equally attractive, while the private label is more attractive in the margarine 
and milk categories (MPLMA = .5, p < .1; MPLM = .9, p < .01) and less attractive in 
the cereals category (MPLC = –1.21, p < .01) than the respective national brands 
(benchmark levels). Although our manipulation checks indicated that in all four 
categories, the selected national brands have a greater perceived quality than 
the private label, apparently the latter sometimes has greater baseline attrac-
tiveness because of its lower price. 
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Table 2.11 Parameter Estimates of Attribute-Specific Constants 
 Mean Standard 
Deviation 
 Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Orange Juice Margarine 
Brand Intercepts Brand Intercepts 
Minute Maid .00 .00 Becel .00 .00 
Delhaize .05 (.15) .94*** (.12) BecelOmega -.86 (.63) -1.30*** (.44) 
Granini -.46** (.20) -.75*** (.19) Becelproactiv -.66** (.27) -.96*** (.25) 
Looza -.67*** (.19) -.06 (.23) Delhaize .50* (.30) -1.11*** (.20) 
Appelsientje .91*** (.11) .47*** (.12) Belolive .89*** (.23) -.01 (.58) 
Oxfam .04 (.17) .46** (.19) Bertolli .28 (.26) .36 (.33) 
Flavor Intercepts Effi .19 (.34) -.39 (.31) 
Normal .00 .00 Planta .55** (.26) -.91*** (.20) 
Pulp -1.60*** (.12) -1.57*** (.14) Vitelma .46** (.23) -.45*** (.17) 
Breakfast -1.77*** (.38) -.99 (.30) AlproSoja .53** (.21) -.10 (.30) 
   Benecol -.63 (.47) -.84** (.34) 
   Flavor Intercepts 
   Normal .00 .00 
   Light -.08 (.08) .28 (.23) 
   Oliveoil 
 
-.05 (.41) -.75 (.51) 
Cereals   Milk   
Brand Intercepts Brand Intercepts 
Kelloggs .00  .00 Campina .00 .00 
Delhaize -1.21*** (.17) -2.26*** (.19) Delhaize .90*** (.16) 1.83*** (.15) 
Nestlé -.23** (.10) -.29*** (.11) Inza -.85**(.38) -1.33*** (.34) 
Type Intercepts Joyvalle .98*** (.14) .69*** (.19) 
Rice .00 .00 Danone -1.53*** (.45) -1.88*** (.27) 
Corn -.06 (.27) -.05 (.20) Type Intercepts 
Wheat -.44** (.19) .21** (.08) Halffull 1–2% fat .00 .00 
Mixed -.37* (.20) -.20** (.08) Full 3–4% fat -1.35*** (.12) -1.55*** (.15) 
Form Intercepts Lowfat .1–.5% fat -.99*** (.11) .68*** (.15) 
Flakes .00  .00  Skim 0% fat -1.42*** (.15) .56** (.23) 
Balls .02 (.17) .16 (.17) Flavor Intercepts 
Loops .19 (.16) -.01 (.20) Normal .00 .00 
Puffies -.33* (.19) .11 (.11) Lactosefree -2.01*** (.42) -1.50*** (.31) 
Cups -.12 (.16) .12 (.15) Fibre -2.39*** (.61) .12 (.76) 
Package -.56*** (.16)  .36** (.17) Children -1.12** (.50) -.83** (.35) 
Specialform -.97*** (.15) -.27* (.15) Vitamins -.14 (.19) .07 (.23) 
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 Mean Standard 
Deviation 
 Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Flavor Intercepts    
Darkchoco .00 .00    
Health -.39*** (.13) 1.28*** (.11)    
Milkchoco -.16 (.12) -.05 (.13)    
Natural -.10 (.11) .63*** (.14)    
Honeysugar -.08 (.14) -.32*** (.10)    
Fruit -.43*** (.13) -.57*** (.15)    
Special -.04 (.16) .49*** (.15)    
* p < .1. ** p < .05. *** p < .01.  
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. 
 
Table 2.12 presents the parameter estimates for the control and promotional 
variables. At the incidence level, the estimated mean parameters for the control 
variables show the expected signs. The coefficients of the mean-centered inven-
tory (INV) coefficients are negative and significant (p < .01) across all catego-
ries. As expected, the fewer units consumers have in stock, the more likely they 
make a purchase. The parameter estimates of the average inter-purchase dura-
tion (IPDUR) variable are also negative and significant (p < .01). The higher the 
respondent’s usual inter-purchase time, the less likely he or she purchases in 
the category. Finally, in line with our expectations and previous research (e.g. 
Train 2003), the means of the coefficients of the inclusive value (IV) are be-
tween 0 and 1. As the standard deviations of the parameters’ distributions 
show, at the incidence level all but two standard deviations are highly signifi-
cant, indicating considerable consumer heterogeneity. Yet a large majority of 
consumers still react in the direction of the mean effect. For example, the 
standard deviations of the distributions for the coefficient of INV indicate that 
in all four categories, more than 90% of the consumers have a negative coeffi-
cient for INV. At the choice level, we observe that loyalty (Loy) and the pur-
chase-feedback indicator (LB) on average exert a significantly (p < .01) positive 
influence on utility in all categories. Considerable consumer heterogeneity also 
exists at this decision level, but when we take into account the magnitude of the 
standard deviation, a large majority of consumers have a coefficient that shows 
the same sign as the mean effect. For example, for Loy, although consumer het-
erogeneity is substantial, at least 99% of consumers have a positive coefficient.  
2.6.1.2. Quantity 
Next, we examine the impact of control variables on consumers’ quantity deci-
sions. The effect of loyalty (Loy) is positive and significant (p < .01), except for 
the margarine category, in which it is only weakly significant (p < .1). For two of 
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the four categories, the results indicate a significantly (p < .01) negative mean 
effect of inventory (INV) on the quantity decision. For cereals, the mean effect is 
not significantly different from zero, while it is positive and significant (p < .01) 
for the orange juice category, which may be due to cyclic buying behavior. That 
is, consumers purchase large amounts in a certain period and nothing or much 
less in other periods. The last control variable in the quantity model is a con-
sumer’s usual average quantity bought per shopping trip (Avquan). The mean 
effect is significant (p < .01) and positive for all four categories. At the quantity 
level, we also find unobserved consumer heterogeneity, which is particularly 
evident in the milk category. Here, 29% of consumers have a positive INV coef-
ficient, signaling cyclic purchase behavior, and 23% have a negative Loy coeffi-
cient. In summary, the estimated coefficients of the control variables indicate 
that the participants in our shopping simulation on average behaved in line 
with purchase behavior observed in similar shopping experiments and in real-
life purchase data (Ailawadi et al. 2007; Breugelmans et al. 2006; Foubert and 
Gijsbrechts 2007).  
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2.6.2. The Impact of Premium Promotions on Purchase Decisions 
We examine the hypotheses for and expectation of the absolute impact of pre-
mium promotions on incidence, choice, and quantity (H1 and E1, Table 2.13).  
2.6.2.1. Choice and Incidence Effects  
As explained previously, the effects of promotions on the incidence and choice 
decisions are governed by the same principles. Specifically, at the incidence 
level, a promotion’s impact manifests through the inclusive value, which cap-
tures the changes in the SKU’s utility as a result of the promotion. In line with 
random utility maximization theory (Train 2003), the mean coefficients of IV 
are between 0 and 1. Thus, on average, a positive promotion effect on an item’s 
utility will also translate into a positive effect on incidence. Table 2.12 shows 
that in the choice model, the coefficient of Prem, a dummy that equals 1 for 
every premium, is on average positive and significant (p < .01) in all categories. 
However, to evaluate the total effect of each premium, we should also consider 
the coefficients of RelPrem, which captures the change in effectiveness when a 
premium is related (rather than unrelated) to the product, and PremNB, which 
captures the change in effectiveness when a premium comes with a national 
brand (rather than a private label). Specifically, we add up the mean coeffi-
cients as shown in the first row of Table 2.13 and conduct t-tests to test wheth-
er the mean effects differ from zero. As Table 2.14 shows, the results reveal that 
premiums—unrelated or related and national brands or private labels—exert a 
significant and positive influence on consumers’ incidence and choice decisions. 
With the exception of premiums that come with national brands in the cereals 
category (p < .1), all coefficients are significant at the .01 level. To investigate 
the unobserved consumer heterogeneity of the total premium effects, we add 
up the variances of the parameters’ distributions and take the square root to 
derive the standard deviations (Table 2.14). The results indicate that the major-
ity of respondents, always greater than 93%, react positively to premiums. 
These results lend support to H1.  
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Table 2.13 Summary of Hypotheses 
 Purchase Level Relationship 
H1 Incidence and 
choice 
Premium effects are positive. 0 < τIV < 1 
βPrem > 0 
βPrem + βRelPrem > 0 
βPrem + βPremNB > 0 
βPrem + βRelPrem + βPremNB > 0 
E1 Quantity Premiums have no or  
negative effects. 
γPrem ≤ 0 
γPrem + γRelPrem ≤ 0 
γPrem + γPremNB ≤ 0 
γPrem + γRelPrem + γPremNB ≤ 0 
H2a Incidence and 
choice 
Relatedness increases the 
relative performance of 
premiums. 
βRelPrem > 0  
H2b Quantity γRelPrem > 0 
H3 Incidence and 
choice 
Relative performance of 
premiums decreases when 
moving from a private label  
to a national brand. 
βPremNB < βPCNB 
H4 Incidence and 
choice 
H3 is particularly true for 
utilitarian product categories. 
MA (βPCNB – βPremNB) > OJ (βPCNB – βPremNB)a 
MA (βPCNB – βPremNB) > CE (βPCNB – βPremNB)a 
MI (βPCNB – βPremNB) > OJ (βPCNB – βPremNB)a 
MI (βPCNB – βPremNB) > CE (βPCNB – βPremNB)a 
aMA = margarine, MI = milk, OJ = orange juice, and CE = cereals. 
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Table 2.14 Total Premium Effects (TPE) 
Type of 
Premium 
Orange Juice  Cereals  
Private Label National Brand Private Label National Brand 
 TPE Standard Deviation TPE 
Standard 
Deviation TPE 
Standard 
Deviation TPE 
Standard 
Deviation 
Choice 
Unrelated 1.81*** 
(8.90) 
.64 1.18***
(2.78)
.79 1.81***
(7.01)
.57 .92* 
(1.89)
.62 
Related 2.29***  
(6.68) 
.91  1.66***
(3.32)
1.02 1.96***
(4.25)
.61 1.07* 
(1.76)
.67 
Quantity 
Unrelated .03 
(.56) 
.01 .06 
(.53) 
.01 .79*** 
(2.60)
.44 .02 
(.04) 
.47 
Related .09 
(.29) 
.04  .12 
(.35) 
.04 .91* 
(1.68)
.45 .14 
(.19) 
.48 
Type of 
Premium 
Margarine  Milk  
Private Label National Brand Private Label National Brand 
 TPE Standard Deviation TPE 
Standard 
Deviation TPE 
Standard 
Deviation TPE 
Standard 
Deviation 
Choice 
Unrelated 1.89*** 
(6.60) 
.01  2.00***
(3.19)
.15  1.86***
(9.21)
.01 2.26***
(5.27)
.39 
Related 2.32*** 
(4.94) 
.11  2.43***
(3.32)
.19  1.94***
(5.60)
.41  2.34***
(4.57)
.57 
Quantity 
Unrelated .14 
(.78) 
.08  -.05 
(.09) 
.12  .08*** 
(2.23)
.01 .06 
(.24) 
.03 
Related .05 
(.14) 
.4  -.14 
(.30) 
.41 .03 
(.46) 
.02  .01 
(.17) 
.03 
* p < .1. ** p < .05. *** p < .01.  
Notes: t-values are in parentheses.  
 
The standard deviations of the total premium effects are calculated by adding 
up the variances (in the computation of the total premium effect included) of 
the parameters’ distributions and taking the square root of this sum.  
2.6.2.2. Quantity Effects  
Table 2.12 reports population means and standard deviations of the coeffi-
cients of the variables Prem, RelPrem, and PremNB. As previously, we need to 
combine the coefficients as summarized in Table 2.13 and conduct t-tests to 
determine whether the various premiums have a mean effect that is different 
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from zero. The results displayed in Table 2.14 show that, on average, premiums 
have no effect on consumers’ quantity decisions; only three of the 16 mean 
effects are significant. To assess the ‘strength’ of these non-significant results, 
we conduct a power analysis (Murphy and Myors 1998). For the non-significant 
effects to become significant at the .05 level with a power of .8 (the traditional 
standard for adequate power), the sample must consist of at least 23,800 con-
sumers in the orange juice category, 134,500 in the cereals category, 11,100 in 
the margarine category, and 44,800 consumers in the milk category. As in the 
choice level, we also examine the unobserved consumer heterogeneity of the 
total premium effects at the quantity level. The mean effects of the orange juice 
category, the milk category, and the private margarine labels do not suffer from 
heterogeneity and are true for approximately 90% of the consumers. However, 
for the cereals brands and the national margarine brands, the calculated stand-
ard deviations of the parameter estimates’ distributions reveal strong consum-
er heterogeneity. Approximately 35% of consumers in the cereals category 
react negatively, and 35% of consumers of national margarine brands react 
positively and, thus, in the opposite direction of the estimated mean effect. 
Therefore, 13 of the 16 mean effects in Table 2.14 are non-significant, and two 
of the three significant mean effects are subject to strong heterogeneity. Thus, 
we find at least partial support for our expectation that premium promotions 
have no (or a negative) impact on customers’ quantity decisions.  
2.6.3. Moderating Effects of Relative Premium Effectiveness 
In H2–H4, we compare the effects of premiums and equivalent price cuts and 
investigate the moderating impact of three factors on these promotions’ rela-
tive performance. Before we reflect on the results of our hypotheses tests, note 
that in our model, the price-cut effects are captured by the variables PC, Disc, 
and PCNB (see Table 2.12). The mean effect of PC, a dummy that indicates the 
mere presence of a price cut, is systematically positive and significant (p < .01) 
at the incidence and choice levels and typically non-significant at the quantity 
level, with the exception of the cereals category (p < .01). The mean effect of 
Disc, which measures the actual discount, is positive and significant (p < .05) at 
all decision levels in all categories, except for cereals. We discuss the effects of 
the dummy variable PCNB, which captures the incremental impact of price 
promoting a national rather than a store brand, subsequently. Finally, although 
consumer heterogeneity in price promotion response at the different decision 
levels is substantial, at least 80% of consumers react in the same direction as 
the mean effects.  
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2.6.3.1. The Moderating Impact of Premium–Product Relatedness  
H2a and H2b hypothesize that relatedness strengthens the relative effective-
ness of premiums on incidence, choice, and quantity. As Table 2.12 shows, the 
mean effect of RelPrem in the incidence and choice model is significantly posi-
tive (p < .01) only for the orange juice category. For the other three categories, 
on average RelPrem does not have a significant impact. Thus, H2a receives only 
limited support. At the quantity level, the mean effects of RelPrem are all non-
significant; thus, H2b also is not supported. Surprisingly, across the three pur-
chase decision levels, premiums tend to have the same effect regardless of their 
relatedness to the product. This finding suggests that consumers tend to evalu-
ate the premium on its own and pay less attention to its functional compatibil-
ity with the category. In the context of fast-moving consumer goods, premiums 
are usually simple and mundane items whose functionality is obvious even 
without a clear link with the category.  
2.6.3.2. Moderating Impact of Private Label versus National Brand  
At the incidence and choice levels, we expect that the performance of premiums 
decreases relative to price cuts in the shift from a private label to a national 
brand (see H3). To test this hypothesis, we focus on the coefficients of PremNB 
and PCNB in the incidence and choice model (Table 2.12). Though not always 
significant, the mean coefficients of PremNB and PCNB follow a similar pattern 
across product categories. That is, they are positive in utilitarian categories and 
negative in hedonic ones. One reason may be that in hedonic categories, nation-
al brands are bought especially because of their intrinsic image, making promo-
tional incentives less effective. In contrast, in utilitarian categories, a promotion 
may be a trigger that attracts customers to the more expensive national brand.  
 To study changes in relative promotion effectiveness when going from a 
private label to a national brand, we compute (βPCNB – βPremNB) for each category. 
This mean difference (MD) is positive and significant in the orange juice (MDOJ 
= .61, p < .05), margarine (MDMa = .91, p < .01), and milk (MDM = 1.64, p < .01) 
categories but non-significant in the cereals category (MDC = –.19, p > .5). Thus, 
in the switch from a private label to a national brand, the effectiveness of a 
premium tends to increase less or decrease more than that of a price cut. This 
finding offers support for H3 and suggests that a price cut induces more asym-
metric switching effects than a premium. At the quantity level, we find no im-
pact of brand type on relative premium effectiveness: None of the differences 
between the coefficients of PCNB and PremNB are significant.  
2.6.3.3. Moderating Impact of Category Type  
We hypothesize in H4 that the lower relative premium effectiveness for nation-
al brands compared with private labels is most prominent in utilitarian catego-
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ries. Therefore, we compare the MD values across categories.4 We find that the 
mean differences in the utilitarian categories are systematically greater than 
those in the hedonic categories. These results are statistically significant (p < 
.01), except for the comparison between the utilitarian margarine category and 
the hedonic orange juice category (p > .5). Overall, these comparisons across 
categories support our expectation that at the incidence and choice levels, the 
lower relative premium effectiveness for national brands is most problematic 
in utilitarian categories. We also compare the MD values across categories at 
the quantity level but find no differences. This result at the quantity level is not 
surprising, because relative promotion effectiveness between private labels 
and national brands does not vary in the first place.  
2.7. Simulation Study 
To translate our results into managerially relevant insights, we conduct a simu-
lation study in which we use the parameter estimates to calculate the percent-
age changes in brand line sales in response to different promotions. Thus, in 
this analysis, we take the perspective of the manufacturer, be it a national 
brand or a private label manufacturer.5 Specifically, we examine the circum-
stances under which a premium is more effective than price cuts, taking into 
account the promotions’ effects on consumers’ incidence, choice, and quantity 
decisions. Throughout the simulation, we also consider our moderators of rela-
tive premium effectiveness: premium–product relatedness, private label versus 
national brand, and hedonism/utilitarianism.  
2.7.1. Approach 
To simulate brand line sales in a given scenario, we compute the expected pur-
chase quantity ܧ൫ܳ௜௛൯ for each SKU i in the relevant brand line and for each 
consumer h in our sample:  
ܧ൫ܳ௜௛൯ =  ܲ௛(݅݊ܿ) ∗  ܲ௛(݅|݅݊ܿ) ∗ ܧ(ݍ௜௛|݅݊ܿ & ݅). (13) 
                                                                  
4 We compute the standard deviations of, for example, MDM – MDOJ as the square root of the sum of 
the variances of MDM and MDOJ. In other words, we ignore the covariance between MDM and MDOJ 
because this would require the simultaneous estimation of our model in both categories (milk and 
orange juice). We believe our approach is rather conservative because the covariance between the 
MD values in two categories is likely to be positive, such that in reality the standard deviation of 
MDM and MDOJ may be smaller than the value we use to compute our t-statistic.  
5 Retailers often outsource the production of their private labels (Ailawadi and Harlam 2009). 
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As previously, ܲ௛(݅݊ܿ) is the purchase incidence probability, and ܲ௛(݅|݅݊ܿ) is 
the choice probability for SKU i conditional on purchase incidence. The term 
ܧ൫ݍ௜௛│݅݊ܿ & ݅൯ represents the expected purchase quantity conditional on inci-
dence and choice, as follows: 
E൫q୧୦│i & ݅݊ܿ൯
୦ = ቀ஛౟
౞ቁ
൬ଵିୣ୶୮ቀି஛౟౞ቁ൰
, (14) 
where ߣ௜௛ is the purchase rate.  
 In our computations, we use the estimated mean coefficients and manipu-
late our marketing variables such that they reflect the scenario of interest. The 
other variables (e.g. SKU loyalty, usual purchase quantity) receive consumer-
specific constant values; for variables that, in principle, vary across time (the 
inventory and purchase-feedback dummy variable), we use consumer-specific 
average values. We obtain brand line sales by aggregating the expected pur-
chase quantities across consumers and the relevant SKUs. Finally, we assess a 
promotion’s impact by computing the percentage change in brand line sales 
relative to the sales in a scenario without any promotions.  
2.7.2. Simulation Results 
The results of our simulation study reveal that though premiums have a posi-
tive effect on consumers’ incidence and choice decisions, their overall impact 
on brand line sales is always considerably smaller than that of an equivalent 
price cut, regardless of the type of promoted brand (private/national) and the 
nature of the premium (related/unrelated) (see Table 2.15).  
 
Table 2.15 Percentage Change in Brand Line Sales  
Category Brand Type Price Cut Related Premium Unrelated Premium 
Orange juice Private label 279.14% 172.39% 118.89% 
National brand 205.60% 87.48% 54.03% 
Cereals Private label 323.69% 247.25% 211.50% 
National brand 60.57% 46.09% 37.78% 
Margarine Private label 360.47% 188.43% 147.87% 
National brand 236.87% 82.81% 66.93% 
Milk Private label 150.05% 76.30% 81.07% 
National brand 239.18% 89.22% 93.87% 
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The main driver of this difference is the promotions’ impact at the quantity 
level. Whereas price cuts have a strong positive impact on consumers’ quantity 
decisions, this is not the case for premium promotions. However, for a fair as-
sessment of the promotions’ relative effectiveness, we also take into account 
the cost of both deal types. Specifically, a premium may cost the manufacturer 
far less than the value consumers ascribe to it. Furthermore, to support a price 
promotion, manufacturers often must grant the retailer a reduction in the 
wholesale price that is greater than the discount to the end consumer. That is, 
retailer pass-through rates are typically lower than 100% (Besanko, Dubé, and 
Gupta 2005; Tyagi 1999). Besanko et al. (2005) report an average pass-through 
rate of 60%, implying that the reduction in the wholesale price is on average 
1/0.6 = 1.67 times greater than the retail discount. Ailawadi and Harlam (2009) 
find a median pass-through rate of merely 20%, with individual rates varying 
between 1.5% and 130%. To account for these concerns, we investigate how 
much the studied premiums should maximally cost per unit for the manufac-
turer to prefer the premium to a price cut with the same cost. We call this 
amount the premium’s “indifference cost”—that is, the promotional cost per 
unit sold of the promoted product that leaves the manufacturer indifferent 
between the premium promotion and a price discount. We compute the premi-
um’s indifference cost for retailer pass-through rates ranging between 5% and 
120%. Figure 2.3 illustrates how the indifference cost arises for the private 
label in the orange juice category. The horizontal curve marks the percentage 
sales impact of the related premium, and the sloped curves represent the per-
centage sales impact of increasing reductions in the wholesale price and alter-
native pass-through rates: The impact of a given reduction in the wholesale 
price on brand line sales shifts upward when the pass-through rate increases. 
The intersections of the premium and discount curves determine the premi-
um’s indifference cost. For example, for a pass-through rate (PTR) of 35%, the 
premium, as long as it does not cost more than 42.9 cents, is more effective than 
a price cut with the same per unit cost. For higher premium costs, the manufac-
turer would be better off (in terms of sales) offering a reduction in the whole-
sale price that equals the premium cost.  
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Figure 2.3 A Premium’s Indifference Costs for a Private Label in the Orange Juice Category  
 
Figure 2.4 presents the premiums’ indifference cost as a function of the retail 
pass-through rates. To increase the generalizability of our findings, the vertical 
axis presents the indifference costs relative to the premium’s value (we discuss 
the absolute indifference costs subsequently). We show the results for related 
and unrelated premiums and for one hedonic (orange juice) and one utilitarian 
(margarine) product category. Unless otherwise indicated, the results of the 
two remaining categories, cereals and milk, also support our conclusions. In the 
graphs of Figure 2.4, the black lines refer to the premium indifference cost for 
the private label, and the red line represents the indifference cost for the na-
tional brand. Note that only Panel A includes results for the national brand 
because in the other settings, a national brand could never benefit more from 
the premium promotion than from a price cut: Regardless of the size of the 
discount, the price cut triggered a fixed sales effect that largely exceeded the 
premium impact. We now discuss the insights emerging from these graphs. 
 First, the curves are negatively sloped, implying that the premium indiffer-
ence cost decreases when the pass-through rate increases. Consider, for exam-
ple, the private label in the (hedonic) orange juice category (solid line in Figure 
2.4, Panel A). For a pass-through rate of 25%, manufacturers can afford to 
spend up to 60 cents for the related premium, or 150% of the premium’s value. 
However, for a pass-through rate of 75%, the related premium’s indifference 
cost drops to 20 cents, or 50% of the premium’s value.  
 Second, although we did not find support for H2a and H2b that related 
premiums are more effective than unrelated premiums, a comparison of Panel 
A with Panels B–D reveals that the indifference cost tends to be greater for 
related than for unrelated premiums. For example, for the private label in the 
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(utilitarian) margarine category (Figure 2.4, Panels C and D) and a pass-
through rate of 40%, the indifference cost for the related premium amounts to 
55.85 cents, or 94.65% of the premium’s value, whereas the indifference cost 
for the unrelated premium is only 26.85 cents, or 48.77% of the premium’s 
value.6 
 Third, although premiums are likely to generate positive sales effects for 
national brands as well as private labels (see Table 2.15), the willingness to pay 
for a premium may be substantially lower for a national brand manufacturer 
than for a private label manufacturer. As demonstrated previously, a premium’s 
relative impact at the incidence and choice levels improves when the premium 
is attached to a private label rather than a national brand (see H3). As Figure 
2.4, Panel A shows, for the related premium in the orange juice category, the 
indifference cost is systematically lower for the national brand than for the 
private label. For example, with a pass-through rate of 30%, the indifference 
cost is 50.11 cents (or 125% of the premium’s value) for the private label, but 
only 6.34 cents (or 15.84% of the premium’s value) for the national brand. In 
the other panels of Figure 2.4, national brand manufacturers should not pay at 
all for the premium, regardless of the pass-through rate, because they are al-
ways better off offering a wholesale discount equivalent to the premium cost.7 
 
  
                                                                  
6 The milk category is an exception because the unrelated premium performs slightly better than 
the related premium (though here too the differences in performance are not based on significant 
coefficients). For example, for a private label at a pass-through rate of 25%, the indifference cost for 
the unrelated premium is 3.63 cents, or 14.29% of the premium’s value. In contrast, the manufac-
turer would not be willing to pay for the related premium, because a price discount with the same 
cost would always generate higher brand line sales. 
7 As an exception, in the cereals category, the relative performance of premiums appears stronger 
for national brands than for private labels. For example, for a related premium and a pass-through 
rate of 30%, the indifference cost is 19.76 cents (or 31.87% of the premium’s value) for the private 
label, but 63.25 cents (or 102.02% of the premium’s value) for the national brand. 
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FIGURE 2.4 Premium Indifference Costs as a Function of Pass-Through Rates 
 
 
Pass-Through Rates (PTR) 
 
Fourth, the difference between the premium indifference cost for private labels 
and national brands is most noticeable in utilitarian categories. Especially in 
utilitarian categories, national brands benefit more from price cuts than from 
premiums (see H4). As a result, the willingness to pay for a premium among 
national brand manufacturers tends to be particularly low in utilitarian catego-
ries. This becomes apparent from Figure 2.4. While for the hedonic category 
orange juice national brand manufacturers may still be willing to pay for a (re-
lated) premium, they are not interested in offering premiums in the utilitarian 
category of margarine because they will always benefit more from a price cut 
(with the same per unit cost).  
2.8. Conclusions and Managerial Implications 
This research contributes to the existing promotions literature by (1) investi-
gating the immediate effects of premium promotions on the three consumer 
purchase decisions (i.e. incidence, choice, and quantity), (2) comparing these 
effects with those of price cuts, and (3) examining the impact of possible mod-
erating variables on relative premium effectiveness. We rely on data from an 
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online shopping experiment in four product categories—orange juice, milk, 
cereals, and margarine—and estimate MNL and Poisson models with unob-
served consumer heterogeneity. In what follows, we discuss the main findings, 
the resultant managerial implications, and the limitations and future research 
directions. 
2.8.1. Main Findings  
This study sheds new light on how premiums perform at the three purchase 
levels and how their effectiveness in comparison with price cuts can change 
depending on the setting. Premiums have a positive effect on consumers’ inci-
dence and choice decisions but do not affect the quantity decision. The compar-
ison of premiums and equivalent price cuts reveals that, in general, price cuts 
generate higher sales than premiums particularly because of their strong effect 
on quantity. However, the examination of the three moderators—premium–
product relatedness, brand type, and category type—suggests that a premium’s 
relative performance can improve. At the incidence and choice level, a premium 
promotion’s relative effectiveness is enhanced if the premium comes with a 
private label rather than a national brand. This effect is intensified if the brand 
belongs to a hedonic rather than a utilitarian product category. Thus, benefit 
congruence (Chandon et al. 2000) increases relative premium performance in 
that a promotion with hedonic benefits (i.e. a premium) performs better in 
hedonic than in utilitarian categories. Surprisingly, we do not find the expected 
positive effect of premium–product relatedness on relative premium effective-
ness. This result suggests that consumers value the premium itself and consider 
the functional compatibility with the category rather unimportant. Further-
more, premiums that are attached to fast-moving consumer goods tend to be 
simple items whose functionality is apparent even without a clear link with the 
category.  
 Although premiums generally generate lower sales than equivalent price 
cuts, we need to consider costs for a fair comparison. Premiums are often worth 
more than they actually cost to the manufacturer. Thus, we conduct a simula-
tion study and account for costs by considering pass-through rates, which rep-
resent how much of a manufacturer’s price reduction a retailer passes on to its 
customers (Ailawadi and Harlam 2009; Besanko et al. 2005). A premium gains 
attractiveness relative to a price cut the lower is the pass-through rate. At the 
same per unit cost, a premium can lead to higher brand line sales than a price 
cut. However, we find that regardless of the pass-through rate, premiums do 
not make sense for utilitarian national brands. Premiums are unable to com-
pete with the strong effect of price cuts on incidence, choice, and quantity. 
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However, for hedonic brands and utilitarian private labels, premiums can be 
successful.  
2.8.2. Managerial Implications 
This study’s findings reveal how strategic objectives are associated with choos-
ing the appropriate promotion type. Premiums can be effective depending on 
the promoter’s objective. In general, managers that want to increase brand line 
sales might consider premiums because consumers, in response to premiums, 
switch to the promoted product. However, premium promotions do not affect 
consumers’ quantity decisions. Managers focusing on increasing secondary 
demand should consider premiums, while managers aiming to increase prima-
ry demand should choose price cuts because of their strong quantity effects. 
The insights of this study lead to different implications and suggestions for 
manufacturers and retailers. 
 Increasing secondary demand is particularly important for product manu-
facturers, which typically initiate the use of premium promotions. Depending 
on the promotions’ costs, which we account for in our simulation study, premi-
ums can be an alternative to price cuts. Manufacturers are concerned with in-
creasing their brands’ market share. Primarily, they aim to attract sales from 
other brands and thus may consider using premium promotions. Increasing 
secondary demand can be a manufacturer’s goal in different situations: First, 
when introducing a new product, it might make sense for the manufacturer to 
use a premium to induce trial of the product. Second, to enhance sales of one 
particular brand, the manufacturer could attach an attractive premium, which 
will reduce sales from other brands in the category. 
 Retailers are largely interested in enhancing primary demand in their 
stores. However, premiums do not affect primary demand, and thus price cuts 
should be chosen instead. Yet, if the focus is on increasing secondary demand, 
retailers should consider the use of premium promotions. Many retailers have 
begun producing and selling their own brands to increase revenues and bind 
consumers to their stores. Retailers that want to improve brand line sales of 
their private labels should choose a premium. After all, retailers must carefully 
consider promotional costs because price cuts for private labels are typically 
retailer initiated and not subject to pass-through rates.  
 Of particular interest to both manufacturers and retailers is that a premium 
is often worth more than its costs (Gaeth et al. 1991). Thus, managers should be 
aware of the value consumers attach to the premium because cheap products 
can serve as efficient premium promotions. While price cuts are always worth 
the pronounced discount, premiums can be worth much more than they cost 
and thus outperform price cuts.  
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2.8.3. Limitations 
This study has several limitations that offer opportunities for further research. 
First, although our computer-based shopping experiment enabled us to evoke a 
realistic purchase context and, at the same time, manipulate the factors of in-
terest, it would be useful to study premium promotions with real-life panel 
data.  
 Second, we carefully designed our product portfolios by adding the most 
popular brands but, at the same time, decided to present merely one product 
size. Although this is the most frequently purchased product size, the inclusion 
of other product sizes might help gain additional insights into switching effects 
as a result of premium promotions. 
 Third, we concentrated on the immediate impact of premiums and did not 
make inferences about relative premium performance in the long run. Howev-
er, it might be that the performance of premiums relative to price cuts im-
proves when we also account for effects across time: While price cuts lower 
consumers’ reference price (Lattin and Bucklin 1989), premiums deemphasize 
the product’s price and thus might not lead to lower reference prices (Darke 
and Chung 2005). 
Fourth, we limited our investigation of moderators to three crucial factors. 
Further research could also consider the impact of other factors, such as brand-
ing the premium, imposing a quantity requirement, or stating the value of the 
premium, on purchase behavior.  
 Fifth, we concentrated on the comparison of premiums and price cuts be-
cause the latter is a popular and well-researched promotion. However, further 
research could also compare premiums with other promotions, such as bonus 
pack promotions (Hardesty and Bearden 2003), which offer free additional 
content. Moreover, it would be particularly useful also to consider promotions 
in which a sample of another existing product is attached to the base product. 
Finally, research could broaden the scope of this study by including more prod-
uct categories or studying other non-food fast-moving consumer goods.  
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Chapter 3 
 
The Effects of Free Trials on Consumers’ 
Adoption Decisions of Contractual 
Services 
3.  
This empirical study investigates (1) whether consumers choose a free trial and 
(2) whether using the free trial increases consumers’ adoption likelihood of 
contractual services. We argue that a free trial influences acquisition utility 
through decreased fees and usage effects, transaction utility through negative 
reference price effects, and a set of utility premiums through an option premi-
um and inertial effects. The analysis of panel data from a major European tele-
communications firm with a multinomial Logit model shows that a free trial is 
chosen because it is offered for free. Moreover, its use increases adoption like-
lihood unless consumers’ expected usage frequency by far exceeds their actual. 
The results also provide evidence of negative reference price effects and posi-
tive inertial effects, but cannot verify the expectation that consumers value a 
postponement of their adoption decision through trial use.  
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3.1. Introduction 
The successful introduction of innovations deeply influences a firm’s perfor-
mance (Bayus, Erickson, and Jacobson 2003; Pauwels et al. 2004) and is partic-
ularly crucial for innovations involving high investments in new technologies 
that must be earned back within a reasonable amount of time. To avoid failure, 
managers search for tools to accelerate the adoption process. One often-applied 
tool in practice is the free trial to promote new products or services. A free trial 
allows consumers to experience the product or service for free during a fixed 
time frame and, afterward, to decide whether to purchase. Companies that have 
relied on free trials include Internet providers, such as AOL, which has offered 
cost-free Internet hours to users, and Netflix, a US-based DVD rental site, which 
has used a free-trial subscription. In general, these services are contractual in 
nature and based on innovative technologies. Although free trials for such con-
tractual services are common in practice, academic literature has thus far ig-
nored their effects. Thus, this research examines the impact of free trials on 
consumers’ adoption of a new contractual service.  
 First, only recently have studies begun investigating the role of marketing 
variables in consumers’ adoption decisions (Prins and Verhoef 2007; 
Steenkamp and Gielens 2003). Most research has focused on perceived innova-
tion characteristics and adopters’ personal characteristics, such as socio-
demographics and psychographics (Arts, Frambach, and Bijmolt 2011; Man-
ning, Bearden, and Madden 1995; Meuter et al. 2005; Steenkamp and Burgess 
2002). However, studies on the influence of sales promotions on innovation 
adoption remain rare (Manchanda et al. 2008; Prins and Verhoef 2007; 
Steenkamp and Gielens 2003). Research has explored product sampling (Bawa 
and Shoemaker 2004; Gedenk and Neslin 1999), but because the current study 
examines trial of a contractual service, the context differs fundamentally: A 
service trial involves a fixed consumption period rather than a fixed consump-
tion amount, such that it is necessary to consider usage during the trial. Moreo-
ver, consumers tend to incur setup costs for a service trial and eventually ter-
mination costs at the end of the trial. 
 Second, academic research often ignores actual adoption behavior and 
instead focuses mainly on attitudes toward and intentions to try or purchase 
(Curran, Meuter, and Surprenant 2003; Dabholkar and Bagozzi 2002; Moreau, 
Lehmann, and Markman 2001). However, previous research has shown that, 
especially for innovations, intentions to adopt are poor predictors of actual 
adoption behavior (Arts et al. 2011). 
 Third, the studies that do consider actual consumer behavior are primarily 
concerned with products (Manchanda et al. 2008; Steenkamp and Gielens 
2003), whereas studies on actual adoption behavior of new contractual services 
FREE-TRIAL PROMOTIONS 
73 
are rare (Nam et al. 2010; Prins and Verhoef 2007). From a consumer’s per-
spective, new contractual services bear relatively high risks because they typi-
cally involve a long-term financial commitment.  
 Consequently, the question of how a free-trial promotion of a new contrac-
tual service affects consumers’ adoption behavior remains unanswered. There-
fore, this study strives to contribute to both the adoption and the sales promo-
tion literature by (1) examining the effect of free trials on (2) consumers’ actual 
adoption behavior of (3) a new contractual service. 
 This study uses panel data over a 24-month period to describe consumer 
adoption of digital television in a European country. The data set includes 
10,040 consumers and contains detailed information on subscription and usage 
behavior, demographics, marketing communication variables, and relevant 
trial-related variables. For a limited time, consumers were offered a three-
month free trial as an alternative to the regular 12-month contract to experi-
ence the innovation without the usual costs (i.e., installation/activation and 
monthly fees). The findings show that the consumers accepted the free trial 
more often than the regular offer because of the absence of the regular fees. 
That is, the consumers focused on the fact that the trial is free of charge and 
unexpectedly did not value the option to opt out after the trial. In general, a trial 
promotion increases consumers’ likelihood of adopting the regular paid offer 
after trial because they can avoid paying the installation and activation fees 
again; in addition, they tend to engage in inertial behavior and continue using 
the digital television. However, a free trial suffers from negative reference price 
effects because consumers tend to adjust their internal reference prices down-
ward after the use of a free trial, which decreases adoption likelihood. Finally, 
usage during trial is an important factor: If actual usage is lower than expected, 
consumers are less likely to adopt.  
 The remainder of this chapter proceeds as follows: We first review extant 
literature, present the conceptual framework, and explain the empirical study. 
Then, we describe the mathematical model and the relevant variables and re-
port the results. We conclude with a discussion of the main insights.  
3.2. Literature Review 
First, we review literature on consumers’ responses to sample promotions to 
gain insight into how a trial influences consumers’ purchase decisions. Second, 
we discuss the drivers of innovation adoption—namely, innovation characteris-
tics, consumer characteristics, marketing communication variables, and social 
contagion/word of mouth. Third, we discuss the use of behavioral intention 
measures and actual behavior as outcome variables in innovation adoption 
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literature. We conclude the chapter with a review of innovation adoption re-
search.  
3.2.1. Responses to Product Trial 
Firms regularly employ free samples to boost product sales. Especially in the 
diffusion process of new products, the degree to which consumers try a product 
is a crucial determinant of success (Jain, Mahajan, and Muller 1995). The use of 
sampling promotions has become common practice in the industry and has also 
received attention in academic literature, which reports both evaluative and 
behavioral responses to sample promotions.  
 Using a sample promotion instead of purchasing the product at its regular 
price improves consumers’ attitudes toward and perceptions of the promoted 
brand (Bettinger et al. 1979; Hamm, Perry, and Wynn 1969). The impact of 
samples on attitudes and belief confidence may even be stronger than that of 
advertising (Kempf and Smith 1998; Marks and Kamins 1988; Smith and 
Swinyard 1983). Throughout a product’s life cycle, firms can effectively deploy 
sampling not only to teach consumers about the product and its true character-
istics (Heiman et al. 2001; Sprott and Shimp 2004) but also to prevent consum-
ers from forgetting the product (Heiman et al. 2001).  
 Several studies have documented the behavioral responses to sampling. 
Gedenk and Neslin (1999) demonstrate that samples lead to more positive 
purchase event feedback and greater loyalty than price cuts. Heiman et al. 
(2001) find that sampling can lead to immediate sales increases, and Bawa and 
Shoemaker (2004) show that free samples significantly increase sales of the 
promoted product through (1) greater customer retention after trial, (2) the 
samples’ ability to accelerate purchases, and (3) an increased purchase proba-
bility of consumers who would not have tried the product without the sample. 
Scott (1976), however, shows that a free sample does not increase consumers’ 
likelihood of accepting a regular subscription. Rather, a less strong incentive, 
such as a 50% discount on the sample, proved more effective.  
 The current context, free trials for subscription services, is quite different 
from the settings that have been considered thus far. First, a free trial involves a 
fixed consumption period rather than a fixed consumption amount. The extent 
to which a consumer uses the service during the trial period will clearly affect 
his or her subsequent adoption probability. Thus, this analysis explicitly ac-
counts for usage intensity as a moderator of trial effectiveness. Second, free 
trials for subscription services trigger specific dynamics that also influence the 
adoption decision. For example, efforts to set up the service at the beginning of 
the trial period (e.g. installation) are sunk after the trial, thus encouraging con-
sumers to continue the subscription. Similarly, a consumer’s decision not to 
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adopt at the end of the trial period involves (nonmonetary) opt-out costs (e.g. 
deinstallation), which might form another motivation to adopt the service. 
3.2.2. Drivers of Innovation Adoption 
Extant literature on innovation adoption has mainly focused on two sets of 
drivers: innovation and consumer characteristics (Arts et al. 2011; Manning et 
al. 1995; Meuter et al. 2005). However, research has also recognized the im-
portance of social contagion (Goldenberg et al. 2009; Manchanda et al. 2008; 
Nam et al. 2010) and marketing-mix variables (Manchanda et al. 2008; Prins 
and Verhoef 2007; Steenkamp and Gielens 2003). In what follows, we discuss 
the four different groups of innovation adoption drivers. 
3.2.2.1. Innovation Characteristics  
In general, studies in the field of innovation adoption have employed Innova-
tion Diffusion Theory (Rogers 2003) and the Technology Acceptance Model 
(Davis 1989). According to Innovation Diffusion Theory, relative advantage, 
complexity, trialability, observability, and the compatibility of the innovation 
with the adopter’s values and needs all determine the rate of adoption. These 
variables have regularly been included in research on innovation adoption 
(Gatignon and Robertson 1991; Meuter et al. 2005). The Technology Ac-
ceptance Model suggests that the technology’s perceived usefulness and ease of 
use are antecedents of consumers’ attitudes toward an innovation, which in 
turn predict intentions to use the innovation (Adams, Nelson, and Todd 1992; 
Dabholkar and Bagozzi 2002; Davis 1989). In addition to these variables, uncer-
tainty and perceived risk, which capture the degree to which an innovation’s 
future utility is uncertain, are regularly included in models on innovation adop-
tion (Hoeffler 2003; Ostlund 1974). Table 3.1 summarizes the innovation char-
acteristics and their effects on innovation adoption.  
3.2.2.2. Consumer Characteristics 
Empirical research provides evidence that socio-demographics and psycho-
graphics predict innovation adoption to varying degrees (Arts et al. 2011; Meu-
ter et al. 2005; Ostlund 1974). Although socio-demographics seem the least 
important antecedents (e.g. Arts et al. 2011), most studies still include them; 
the main variables are gender, age, education, and income (Dickerson and Gen-
try 1983; Gielens and Steenkamp 2007; Meuter et al. 2005; Prins and Verhoef 
2007; Steenkamp and Burgess 2002; Steenkamp and Gielens 2003). Although 
psychographics predict innovation adoption better than demographics, re-
searchers have only recently begun including them more frequently (Arts et al. 
2011; Dabholkar and Bagozzi 2002; Meuter et al. 2005). Examples are product 
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involvement (Arts et al. 2011; Moreau et al. 2001), innovativeness (Arts et al. 
2011; Im, Bayus, and Mason 2003), self-efficacy, and self-consciousness (Dab-
holkar and Bagozzi 2002). Table 3.1 reports the descriptions and effects of the 
consumer characteristics. 
3.2.2.3. Social Contagion 
Research has identified social contagion as a determinant of innovation diffu-
sion. At the aggregate level, the Bass (1969) model predicts that innovation 
diffusion is dependent not only on marketing communications but also on in-
teractions between adopters and potential adopters. Only recently have studies 
at the disaggregate level begun also including social contagion as a determinant 
of consumers’ innovation adoption (Iyengar, Van den Bulte, and Valente 2011; 
Manchanda et al. 2008; Nam et al. 2010). Even when marketing effects are con-
trolled for (Iyengar et al. 2011; Manchanda et al. 2008), social contagion is at 
work through social ties; the more social ties a person has, the faster he or she 
adopts because knowledge spreads faster (Goldenberg et al. 2009). However, 
the downside is that the effects of negative word of mouth can be twice as 
strong as positive effects, which may be detrimental for firms (Nam et al. 2010).  
3.2.2.4. Marketing Variables  
The innovation adoption literature has also recognized the importance of mar-
keting variables as antecedents of adoption (Prins and Verhoef 2007; Rogers 
2003; Steenkamp and Gielens 2003). Specifically, trial of innovations may be 
affected by the focal firm’s mass-marketing efforts as well as by its competitors’ 
direct marketing efforts and sales promotions (see Table 3.1) (Manchanda et al. 
2008; Prins and Verhoef 2007; Steenkamp and Gielens 2003). First, advertising 
positively affects innovation adoption by reaching a large amount of potential 
customers and informing them about the existence of the innovation (Prins and 
Verhoef 2007; Steenkamp and Gielens 2003). Competitive mass-marketing 
efforts exert the opposite effect; the more intensively a competitor advertises, 
the less likely consumers will purchase the focal company’s offer (Prins and 
Verhoef 2007; Steenkamp and Gielens 2003). Although mass-marketing efforts 
of both the focal firm and its competitors strongly influence innovation adop-
tion, they are outweighed by the impact of direct marketing efforts. Manchanda 
et al. (2008) and Prins and Verhoef (2007) find that consumers are particularly 
receptive to individually targeted marketing messages. Surprisingly, the effect 
of sales promotions on innovation adoption has received only limited attention. 
Steenkamp and Gielens (2003) report that feature and display promotions posi-
tively affect innovation adoption. Manchanda et al. (2008) examine the effect of 
sampling on innovation adoption and find that the more samples a potential 
adopter receives, the higher is his or her likelihood to adopt. The current study 
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also investigates the impact of trial on subsequent adoption decisions, but as 
argued previously, the context substantially differs. 
 The results of these recent studies illustrate that marketing actions have an 
important impact on consumers’ adoption decisions. However, only a limited 
number of marketing variables have been investigated, and particularly in the 
context of contractual services, popular promotions have been neglected. Ra-
ther, academics have concentrated on innovation and consumer characteristics. 
The current study contributes to the literature by focusing on the effects of a 
free-trial promotion on the adoption behavior of a contractual service while 
examining the effects of important marketing communication variables. In the 
following subsections, we provide a review of the innovation adoption litera-
ture on (1) intentions versus actual behavior and (2) products versus services. 
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3.2.3. Actual Adoption versus Intentions 
Extant literature on innovation adoption has concentrated on attitudes toward 
the innovation or intentions to try or purchase (Curran and Meuter 2007; Cur-
ran et al. 2003; Dabholkar and Bagozzi 2002; Meuter et al. 2000; Moreau et al. 
2001; Plouffe, Vandenbosch, and Hulland 2001). These intentional outcomes 
have been regularly used as an approximation of actual adoption behavior (Van 
Ittersum and Feinberg 2010). However, recent research reports that intentions 
and actual behavior may differ greatly. Extant literature suggests three main 
reasons: First, consumers’ reported intentions to purchase an innovation may 
change over time (Morrison 1979). Second, consumers are not able to incorpo-
rate unexpected events in their intention predictions, leading to inconsistencies 
(Morrison 1979; Morwitz, Steckel, and Gupta 2007). Third, the intention meas-
urements used in studies are often incomplete and therefore lead to biased 
estimates (Van Ittersum and Feinberg 2010). Thus, intentions do not necessari-
ly predict behavior (Arts et al. 2011; Jamieson and Bass 1989; Morwitz et al. 
2007; Sun and Morwitz 2010). Surprisingly, actual consumer behavior has re-
ceived only limited attention in the innovation adoption literature (e.g. 
Manchanda et al. 2008; Meuter et al. 2005; Nam et al. 2010; Prins and Verhoef 
2007; Steenkamp and Gielens 2003). As such, there remains ample room for 
further research on innovation adoption behavior, and this study contributes to 
extant literature by investigating the effect of free trials on actual innovation 
adoption instead of merely examining behavioral intentions. 
3.2.3.1. Adoption of Products versus Contractual Services 
Notably, the studies that have considered actual consumer behavior are pri-
marily concerned with products (Manchanda et al. 2008; Steenkamp and 
Gielens 2003). Only a few studies have examined actual adoption behavior of 
innovative services (Meuter et al. 2005; Nam et al. 2010; Prins and Verhoef 
2007), and to the best of our knowledge, only two have included subscription 
services (Nam et al. 2010; Prins and Verhoef 2007). The majority of studies on 
service innovation adoption focus on self-service technologies (SSTs), such as 
automated teller machines and automated hotel check-outs or airport check-ins 
(Curran et al. 2003; Meuter et al. 2005; Meuter et al. 2000). However, SSTs, as 
well as new products, are not usually sold on a contractual basis and thus bear 
lower risks than subscription services. The acceptance of a contract typically 
involves a long-term financial commitment, which cannot easily be terminated. 
Thus, the adoption of innovative contractual services is a much more complex 
task than trying a new SST or product and eventually requires distinct efforts 
from the selling firms. This study contributes to academic literature by investi-
gating consumers’ adoption behavior in the context of a contractual innovative 
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service. In the following subsections, we develop a framework for the effects of 
trial promotions for subscription services on consumers’ adoption behavior.  
3.3. Conceptual Framework for the Effects of Free Trials 
To better understand the impact of free trials on adoption, we need to account 
for two consumer decisions: (1) the decision to accept the trial promotion, ra-
ther than either directly choosing the regular offer or remaining a nonuser, and 
(2) the decision to adopt the regular offer after experiencing the trial. Both 
decisions likely depend on different “sources” of utility, such as acquisition 
utility, transaction utility (Thaler 1985), and a set of utility premiums. Acquisi-
tion utility is the difference between the expected benefits of purchasing and 
using a service and the monetary outlay to purchase the service. For a subscrip-
tion service, acquisition costs include periodic costs, such as monthly payments, 
and non-periodic setup costs, such as activation and installation fees (Grewal, 
Monroe, and Krishnan 1998). Transaction utility captures the psychological 
satisfaction “from taking advantage of the financial terms of the price deal” 
(Grewal et al. 1998, p. 48; Thaler 1985). Consumers determine a deal’s attrac-
tiveness by comparing their internal reference price with the actual purchase 
price. Consumers’ internal reference prices result from previously paid prices 
and expected future fees (Briesch et al. 1997; Mazumdar, Raj, and Sinha 2005). 
A reference price below the actual purchase price decreases the attractiveness 
of the deal, and a reference price above the actual purchase price increases the 
attractiveness. Utility premiums are the remaining utility components that exist 
from the intertemporal nature of the decision context. This study examines an 
inertia premium and an option premium, which we explain subsequently. 
 In what follows, we discuss how a free trial affects these utility compo-
nents. Specifically, we compare the utility of accepting the free trial and then 
adopting the regular offer after the free trial with the utility of directly adopting 
the regular offer without prior trial. Table 3.2 summarizes the expected effects.  
3.3.1. Utility of Free-Trial Acceptance  
The utility of accepting the free trial differs from the utility of directly adopting 
the regular offer. In the following subsections, we discuss the mechanisms that 
drive this difference in utilities—in particular, in acquisition utility, transaction 
utility, and the utility premiums.  
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3.3.1.1. Acquisition Utility 
In general, compared with the regular offer, a free trial is likely to have a higher 
acquisition utility. During the free trial, the service is available at zero monthly 
cost and without the usual setup cost and thus entails lower acquisition cost. At 
the same time, a free trier receives all the benefits of the service, such that ac-
quisition utility is higher than that for the regular offer.  
3.3.1.2. Transaction Utility 
A consumer’s reference price results from prior and current purchase experi-
ences (Briesch et al. 1997; Mazumdar et al. 2005). Consumers’ internal refer-
ence prices are the same no matter whether they adopt the regular offer right 
away or choose the free trial. For free trials, however, consumers’ internal ref-
erence prices exceed the actual costs because the free trial includes no setup 
costs or monthly fees. Consequently, transaction utility should be positively 
influenced.  
3.3.1.3. Utility Premiums 
The free trial offers consumers the opportunity to postpone their actual adop-
tion decision by three months. Consumers value the option to decide only after 
the trial whether they want to opt out of the contract without further cost or 
become regular subscribers (Haenlein, Kaplan, and Schoder 2006; Kridel, Leh-
man, and Weisman 1993). An innovation involves unpredictable risks, such as 
financial, performance, social, psychological, security, and time/convenience 
losses (Allenby and Rossi 1999; Dowling 1986; Lee and Allaway 2002; Prins 
and Verhoef 2007), which makes the adoption decision particularly difficult. A 
trial with an opt-out option gives consumers the chance to experience the ser-
vice without fear of large losses. Thus, this option premium affects utility posi-
tively.  
3.3.2. Utility of Regular Offer Adoption After Trial 
The second consumer decision of interest is whether to adopt the regular paid 
service after using a free trial. Again, this choice alternative’s utility is affected 
by acquisition utility, transaction utility, and a set of utility premiums, com-
pared with direct adoption without prior trial.  
3.3.2.1. Acquisition Utility 
In contrast with the decision to directly adopt the service without prior trial, 
acquisition utility is affected in two ways. First, after using a trial promotion, 
consumers do not need to incur additional setup costs to continue the contract. 
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All necessary actions have already been taken, such that the cost of subscribing 
after trial is lower than the cost of subscribing without prior trial.  
Second, a trial enables the consumer to use the service. Prior research has iden-
tified usage as an important antecedent of perceived payment equity, which 
refers to the consumer’s perceived fairness of the deal (Bolton and Lemon 
1999; Curran et al. 2003). In particular, consumers compare the benefits of 
usage with the costs they must incur. For services with fixed fees, independent 
of usage (as is often the case for subscription services), perceived payment 
equity increases. As a result, compared with the utility of directly adopting the 
regular offer without prior trial, the utility of adopting after trial will be higher 
if actual usage exceeds expected usage but lower if actual usage stays below 
expectations.  
3.3.2.2. Transaction Utility 
Transaction utility of adopting the regular offer after having used a free trial 
differs from that of direct adoption. After using a free trial, consumers may 
correct their internal reference prices downward. Thus, negative reference 
price effects, which decrease transaction utility of adopting the regular offer 
after using a free trial, should occur.  
3.3.2.3. Utility Premiums 
Free trials offer consumers the chance to opt out after the trial period. Howev-
er, in consumer behavior, inertia plays an important role. Often, consumers 
avoid variety and simply choose the same product or service they have chosen 
before (Bawa 1990). That is, the consumer is not necessarily loyal (Jeuland 
1979) but rather unmotivated or not dissatisfied enough to search for an alter-
native. The opt-out characteristic requires consumers to actively finish the 
contract after the free-trial period. The inertia effect will be active in this case, 
and thus consumers, if they are not completely dissatisfied, rather passively 
adopt the regular offer than actively opt out. Thus, compared with the utility of 
adopting the regular offer without prior trial, the utility of adoption after trial 
can benefit from an inertia premium.  
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Table 3.2 Expected Effects 
 Free-Trial Acceptance Effect Paid Service Adoption  
After Trial 
Effect 
Acquisition 
utility 
No installation/activation 
and no periodic fees during 
trial 
+ Comparison of actual and 
expected usage 
 
No installation/activation fee
+/– 
 
 
+ 
Transaction 
utility 
No installation/activation 
and no periodic fees during 
trial 
+ Decrease in reference price 
after free trial 
− 
Utility premiums Option premium + Inertia premium + 
3.4. Empirical Study  
3.4.1. Study Context 
To investigate the effects of free-trial promotions, we use data from a European 
telecom operator that provides telephone, Internet, and television services. The 
data describe consumers’ adoption behavior and the company’s marketing 
efforts for interactive digital television (IDTV) during the first two years after 
the service’s launch.8 The company is the only player in the studied country to 
offer IDTV via digital subscriber line (DSL). Its main competitor provides IDTV 
via cable. To use the focal company’s IDTV service, customers need a DSL mo-
dem and a set-top box that decodes the digital signal and allows interaction 
with the television content. The service provides access to a wide selection of 
television channels in digital quality, an electronic program guide, and video-
on-demand (including movies, concerts, shows, and newscasts). Under regular 
conditions, new IDTV customers sign a 12-month contract with automatic re-
newal. They also pay a one-time installation/activation fee and a monthly flat 
rate for the basic channel package and set-top box, but the wireless DSL modem 
is free.  
 Especially in the first years after product launch, many consumers were 
uncertain about the nature and benefits of DSL-based IDTV. In an attempt to 
accelerate adoption, the company made extensive use of free-trial promotions: 
between months 10 and 19 of the two-year observation period, consumers 
could subscribe to a three-month free trial of the IDTV offer, without any pur-
chase obligation. Subscribers either received the necessary hardware by mail 
and installed everything themselves or were visited by a technician who han-
                                                                  
8 Because in the studied country most television channels still also broadcast an analog signal, the 
adoption of IDTV involves a truly free choice. 
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dled the installation. After the trial, customers could cancel the contract and 
return the set-top box to one of the operator’s many shops or do nothing and 
thus continue the contract as regular users, paying the full price. Thus, similar 
to many free-trial offers, the contract was extended as long as the customer did 
not opt out. Between months 20 and 23, the company changed its promotion 
from a free trial to a paid trial, which allowed consumers to try the product for 
three months at the regular price without further purchase obligations. This 
paid trial enables us to isolate specific mechanisms in our analysis, such as pos-
sible reference price effects of the free trial.  
 Parallel to the trial promotions, the operator continued offering the regular 
12-month subscription, typically at a price discount. Whether consumers de-
cided to adopt the regular offer at a discount or the trial was largely dependent 
on their awareness of both deals.  
3.4.2. Specific Data Set 
From our initial sample of more than 170,000 customers, we selected a subset 
of 10,040 customers on the basis of several criteria. First, because the IDTV 
service was initially only available to households with a sufficiently fast DSL 
connection (from the focal company9), we selected only customers who already 
had an adequate Internet connection before the company’s launch of IDTV. That 
is, we do not separately model consumers’ Internet adoption or upgrading deci-
sions. Second, we removed households that were too far away from the nearest 
DSL hub to receive the IDTV signal (even when they had an adequate Internet 
connection).10 Third, we retained only households for which we had detailed 
socio-demographic information. 
 Our data set indicates for each customer if and in which month he or she 
subscribed to the free trial or adopted the regular service. Furthermore, we 
know how extensively each free-trial subscriber used the service. In particular, 
we have information on IDTV users’ monthly number of channel zaps. The data 
set also describes the marketing efforts of the focal company during the obser-
vation period. Apart from the exact timing of the free trial, it contains pricing 
information for the paid IDTV service, the monthly number of direct marketing 
contacts per consumer (through telephone, e-mail, or regular mail), and month-
ly region-specific advertising expenditures. The latter information is also avail-
                                                                  
9 In the studied period, the company’s market share of the DSL market was more than 75%. 
10 As the company continuously added hubs, it regularly updated its database, flagging those cus-
tomers that were within reach of the IDTV signal. We selected only households that were already 
flagged on the first few updates, though we recognized that some of these households may not have 
had access to IDTV before these updates.  
FREE-TRIAL PROMOTIONS 
87 
able to the company’s main competitor. We discuss the few variables not explic-
itly mentioned here when introducing them in the model. 
 Table 3.3 contains descriptive statistics of the data. As panel A shows, the 
focal company makes extensive use of direct marketing and, on average, invests 
more than twice as much in advertising than its main competitor. However, all 
variables vary greatly over time or across consumers. Panel B provides a tenta-
tive indication of adoption behavior and free-trial effectiveness. In general, 
22.27% of the customers adopted the regular (i.e., paid) IDTV service at some 
point during the observation period. Of all the customers who took advantage 
of the free trial, 61.01% became paying IDTV users after the trial. In compari-
son, of the customers who did not accept the free-trial offer, only 14.56% 
adopted IDTV. Although these numbers summarize general behavior, they do 
not indicate the underlying mechanisms. That is, do consumers choose a trial 
because of the opt-out option or because it is free? Does a free trial merely have 
positive effects on the decision to adopt the regular offer, or does the negative 
reference price effect play a role as well? Evidently, a systematic approach is 
necessary to identify these mechanisms.  
Table 3.3 Data Descriptives 
A. Basic Statistics 
Variable Average Standard Deviation 
Monthly number of direct marketing contacts per 
consumer  
.23 .64 
Monthly advertising expenditures of focal company 
(in thousands of euros) 
2,066.78  1,519.37 
Monthly advertising expenditures of main competitor 
(in thousands of euros) 
917.36  463.12 
Monthly number of channel zaps per trial subscriber  162.44 166.23 
 
B. Tentative Indicators of Adoption Behavior and Free-Trial Effectiveness 
Group N Adopters of Paid IDTV 
Service (% of N) 
Complete sample 10,040 2,236 (22.27%) 
Free triers  1,667  1,017 (61.01%) 
Non-free triers  8,373  1,219 (14.56%) 
3.5. Model and Variable Description 
We model consumers’ decisions over time using the multinomial logit model. 
There are three choice alternatives: (1) no adoption, (2) acceptance of the trial 
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promotion, and (3) adoption of the regular offer. The availability of these choice 
alternatives varied over time. Figure 3.4 illustrates when each alternative was 
available to consumers. From months 1 to 9, the free trial was not available, and 
consumers could either do nothing or adopt the regular offer. The company 
introduced the promotion in month 10. If a consumer accepts a free trial 
(month 11), he or she continues using the free trial during the three-month trial 
period (months 11–13). After the free trial (3 months + 1, see month 14), the 
consumer can either adopt the regular offer or stop using the service.  
Table 3.4 An Example of Alternative Availability 
Month 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
No purchase x x X x   x 
Free trial   X A1 x x  
Adopt regular offer x x X x   x 
 1Consumer accepts free trial. 
 
The utility Zhit that a consumer h derives from a particular choice i at time t is 
divided into an observed part Vhit and an unobserved portion εhit. 
Zhit = Vhit + εhit. (1) 
The εhit are independent and type I extreme value distributed. As a result, we 
can write the probability that consumer h chooses option i at time t ௛ܲ௧(݅) as 
follows: 
P୦୲(i) = ୣ୶୮(୚౞౟౪)∑ ୣ୶୮൫୚౞ౠ౪൯ౠ . 
The observed choice utility Vhit is:  
Vhit = βRO * ROi + βTO * TOi + βFT * FTi + βUSAGE * USAGEhit + βFBT * FBThit + 
βFBFT * FBFThit + βc * Chit.  (3) 
3.5.1. Alternative Specific Intercepts 
We include alternative specific intercepts in the model to capture the intrinsic 
differences in choice utility. We set the utility of the “no-purchase” alternative 
to zero and use it as the benchmark. RO equals 1 for the regular offer and for a 
trial promotion (both free and paid) and 0 otherwise. TO is a dummy that 
equals 1 for a trial promotion (both free and paid). FT also is a dummy and 
equals 1 for a free trial and 0 otherwise.  
 The inclusion of all three variables leads to the following interpretation of 
the coefficients: The coefficient of RO corresponds to the intrinsic utility con-
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sumers attach to the regular offer. The coefficients of TO and FT capture incre-
mental effects: The coefficient of TO captures the utility of a paid trial, and the 
coefficient of FT is the incremental effect if a trial is free rather than paid. Alt-
hough we do not directly examine the effects of paid trials, the inclusion helps 
isolate certain mechanisms. The significance of the coefficient of TO determines 
whether consumers value the option premium, which is the utility they attach 
to postponing the adoption decision. If a significant incremental effect emerges, 
the option premium increases the attractiveness of the paid trial compared 
with the regular offer. The coefficient of FT represents the incremental effect of 
paying less (no monthly fees and no installation and activation fees) for a free 
trial. If this coefficient is significant, consumers value the fact that the free trial 
is provided free. Table 3.5 summarizes the coefficients and the mechanisms 
they represent.  
Table 3.5 Mechanisms and Related Coefficients 
Mechanisms Coefficients 
Intrinsic utility of regular offer βRO 
Option premium βTO 
No installation/activation fee; no subscription fee during the free-trial period βFT 
Actual usage–expected usage βUSAGE 
Inertia premium; no installation/activation fee βFBT 
Negative reference price effect  βFBFT 
3.5.2. Feedback Variables 
Three variables describe the feedback effect of trial promotions on adoption 
probability. Again, we include paid-trial effects to isolate the underlying mech-
anisms. FBT is a dummy variable that equals 1 when a consumer finished using 
either a free or a paid trial. FBFT also is a dummy variable that equals 1 when 
the consumer took advantage of the free trial. The coefficient of FBT captures 
the effect of a paid trial on adoption of the regular offer, and the coefficient of 
FBFT indicates the incremental effect if a consumer used a free trial rather than 
a paid trial. The third feedback variable is the variable USAGE, which is a cumu-
lative measure of a consumer’s channel zaps during the trial period. We mean-
center the variable to capture the extent to which consumers’ actual usage de-
viates from average expected usage. We calculate expects to use the service 
before the trial. Its coefficient represents the the mean of the USAGE variable as 
a proxy for the intensity with which the average customer effect of actual usage 
compared with the average consumer’s expected usage on adoption probability 
of the regular offer. 
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 The three variables help in differentiating the three mechanisms that influ-
ence the adoption decision after trial. First, the coefficient of FBT represents the 
inertia premium and the absence of installation and activation fees. Second, the 
coefficient of USAGE captures the difference between actual and expected us-
age. According to our expectation, the less negative or more positive this differ-
ence, the higher is the acquisition utility. Third, the coefficient of FBFT captures 
the change in transaction utility due to possible negative reference price effects.  
3.5.3. Control Variables 
In line with extant literature on innovation adoption, we include several control 
variables. The first set of controls includes marketing variables and remaining 
fluctuations. The variable CONTACT represents the number of direct contacts 
through mail, e-mail, or telephone. A positive impact on adoption should 
emerge because consumers are individually targeted and thus might pay par-
ticular attention to the marketing message (Manchanda et al. 2008; Prins and 
Verhoef 2007). The coefficients of ADV and CADV capture the impact of the 
firm’s and the main competitor’s mass advertising. The values of advertising 
spending vary depending on time and the consumer’s living area: We know 
when, where, and how much the firms spend on their IDTV advertising cam-
paigns. In line with extant literature, a positive impact of ADV and a negative 
impact of CADV on adoption should emerge (Prins and Verhoef 2007; 
Steenkamp and Gielens 2003). We also include the impact of the discount, DISC, 
which the focal firm offers on the monthly fees and installation costs of the 
regular offer. In general, a discount should influence adoption likelihood posi-
tively. Finally, we incorporate the trend variables Month, Month2, and Month3, 
which form a third-degree polynomial that captures any remaining effects, such 
as social contagion/word of mouth.  
 The second set of control variables are consumer-specific variables. The 
variable INC, the average yearly income before taxes within the consumer’s 
statistical tract, should have an influence. The direction is not certain, however: 
On the one hand, a higher income enables consumers to invest in new technol-
ogies (Meuter et al. 2005). On the other hand, the innovative technology studied 
is an advancement of traditional television. Television is a widely accepted 
medium, particularly across lower-income groups (O'Guinn and Shrum 1997), 
such that there may be an increased likelihood of these lower-income groups to 
adopt IDTV. We also include AGE in the model (i.e. the consumer’s age at the 
beginning of the observation period); we expect that younger consumers are 
more likely to adopt because they are more receptive to innovations than older 
consumers. HHsize, a consumer’s household’s size, should also have a positive 
effect because the service’s value increases when more people use it. As a 
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measure of relationship length, we include the variable LENGTH, which 
measures the period a consumer has been using ADSL. The longer a consumer 
has been with a company, the more receptive he or she is to new offers (Prins 
and Verhoef 2007).  
3.5.4. Estimation 
We estimated the multinomial logit model with the PROC MDC tool of SAS 9.2; 
PROC MDC can incorporate various choice alternatives. Because the different 
choice alternatives were not always available at the same time, we needed to 
accommodate a changing choice set. We use maximum likelihood estimation 
based on the Newton–Raphson method.  
3.6. Results and Discussion 
Table 3.6 summarizes the results of the analysis. We first address the mecha-
nisms that determine the decision to accept the free trial, then focus on the 
decision to adopt the regular offer after trial, and finally consider the control 
variables.  
Table 3.6 Estimation Results 
Variable Coefficient (standard error) p-Value 
RO -5.085 (.197) <.001 
TO -.009 (.187) .962 
FT 2.536 (.141) <.001 
Usage .287 (.018) <.001 
FBT 8.331 (.539) <.001 
FBFT -1.39 (.521) <.01 
Month -.438 (.051) <.001 
Month2 .037 (.004) <.001 
Month3 -.001 (.000) <.001 
ADV .584 (.117) <.001 
CADV .478 (.197) <.05 
DISC .006 (.001) <.001 
CONTACT .6 (.016) <.001 
INC -.013 (.003) <.001 
AGE -.01 (.002) <.001 
HHsize .018 (.012) .142 
LENGTH .003 (.015) .849 
Likelihood -16,023  
Likelihood ratio 356,659  
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3.6.1. Decision to Accept the Free Trial 
The coefficient of RO, the general paid offer, is negative and highly significant 
(βGI = –5.085, p < .001). A priori, a consumer is more likely not to adopt the 
regular paid offer. The coefficient of TO is non-significant (βTO = –.009, p = .962) 
and implies that the intrinsic utility of a paid trial does not differ from the regu-
lar offer’s intrinsic utility. Thus, consumers do not value the option of postpon-
ing the adoption decision through use of the trial period. The positive and sig-
nificant coefficient of FT (βFT = 2.536, p < .001) indicates that consumers value a 
free trial more than a paid trial. Apparently, consumers predominantly value 
the ability to use the service free of charge. The absence of installa-
tion/activation and subscription fees leads to increased acquisition and trans-
action utility. However, we cannot further differentiate the effect of either ac-
quisition or transaction utility.  
3.6.2. Decision to Adopt Regular Offer 
The two trial feedback variables, FBT and FBFT, have significant coefficients 
(βFBT = 8.331, p < .001; βFBFT = –1.390, p < .01). From the positive coefficient of 
FBT, using a trial (paid or free) indeed increases a consumer’s probability of 
adopting the regular offer. The coefficient of FBT combines the effects of two 
mechanisms: First, in contrast with directly adopting the regular offer, consum-
ers do not need to pay any installation/activation fees after using the trial be-
cause the service is already installed and activated. This positively influences 
acquisition utility. Second, a possible inertia premium may also increase con-
sumers’ utility to adopt the regular offer after using free trial compared with 
the paid trial. Consumers who receive the trial free of charge seem to adjust 
their internal reference price downward, which decreases transaction utility of 
the paid offer and, thus, their probability of adopting the regular paid offer. 
 The feedback variable USAGE is positive and highly significant (βUSAGE = 
.287, p < .001), which implies that the less negative/more positive the deviation 
of actual usage from (average) expected usage, the the trial because they are 
either unmotivated or not dissatisfied enough to actively opt out. Instead, con-
sumers are likely to continue the service after the trial. Although we are not 
able to assess the two mechanisms individually, on average they exert a strong 
positive effect on adoption of the regular offer. However, the negative coeffi-
cient of FBFT, the free-trial feedback variable, indicates that using a free trial is 
less effective than using a paid trial. This confirms our expectation of negative 
reference price effects of the more likely consumers adopt the regular offer 
after the trial. In contrast with directly adopting the regular offer without prior 
trial, an actual usage level below average expected usage decreases acquisition 
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utility. Yet, to obtain a negative net trial impact, the deviation of actual usage 
from (average) expected usage must be strongly negative. Figure 3.2 shows that 
the deviation needs to be –2415.31 channel zaps for a negative net trial effect, 
which implies that given an average expected usage of 552.31 zaps, actual us-
age must be strongly negative at –1863 zaps. Because negative actual usage is 
impossible, the results indicate that total trial feedback effects remain positive 
regardless of the usage level. However, there may be situations in which expec-
tations exceed actual usage so far that the deviation in the end is extremely 
negative.  
 
Figure 3.2 Net Effects of a Trial Promotion 
 
3.6.3. Covariates 
The first group of controls, the marketing related variables, shows the expected 
signs; they all have a positive impact on adoption probability. In line with ex-
tant literature, the coefficient of DISC is positive and significant (βDISC = .006, p < 
.001) (Anderson and Simester 2004), as is the coefficient of ADV (βADV = .584, p 
< .001) (Steenkamp and Gielens 2003). Mass advertising creates awareness 
among consumers and proves important in spurring the diffusion of innovative 
services. CADV also has a positive coefficient (βCADV = .478, p < .01), indicating 
that the competitor’s advertising leads to primary demand effects. In line with 
our findings, Prins and Verhoef (2007) find positive effects of a competitor’s 
mass marketing if the service rather than the brand is advertised. Moreover, in 
our specific case, consumers with ADSL connections are rather unlikely to 
switch to a company that provides IDTV via cable. The direct consumer con-
tacts through mail, e-mail, or telephone also positively influence adoption 
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probability (βCONTACT = .600, p < .001). Thus, the more often consumers are con-
tacted about the service, the more likely they adopt (Prins and Verhoef 2007; 
Steenkamp and Gielens 2003; Verhoef, Franses, and Hoekstra 2001). The varia-
bles of the third-degree polynomial (Month, Month2, and Month3) all have sig-
nificant coefficients (βmonth = –.438, p < .001; βmonth2 = .037, p < .001; βmonth3 = –
.001, p < .001), indicating that other factors, which we do not explicitly model 
(e.g. word of mouth), drive consumers’ adoption decisions.  
 Finally, with regard to the consumer-specific control variables, the coeffi-
cient of INC is slightly negative (βINC = –.013, p < .001); the higher a consumer’s 
yearly income, the less likely he or she adopts. This is unexpected, because 
prior studies have found positive effects (Gatignon and Robertson 1991; Meu-
ter et al. 2005; Rogers 2003). However, in our context, consumers with lower 
income may be particularly interested because the innovation pertains to tele-
vision. For example, O’Guinn and Shrum (1997) find that television viewing 
times and income are negatively related. The variable AGE has a negative effect 
on adoption probability (βAGE = –.01, p < .001), which is in line with other inno-
vation adoption research (Meuter et al. 2005). The variable HHsize (βHHsize = 
.018, p < .05) has a significant, positive impact; that is, the more people in a 
household, the more likely adoption takes place. Finally, relationship length, as 
captured by the variable LENGTH, is non-significant (βLENGTH = .003, p = .849) 
and thus does not influence the adoption decision.  
3.7. Conclusion and Managerial Implications 
This study investigates the influence of a free-trial promotion on consumers’ 
decisions to adopt a new contractual service. To better understand the underly-
ing mechanisms driving adoption in response to free trials, we focus on two 
consumer decisions: the decision to accept the free trial and the decision to 
adopt the regular paid offer after trial. In addition to variables related to trial, 
we include consumer demographics and other marketing communication vari-
ables in the model. We add to promotional and innovation adoption literature 
in three ways: First, the impact of marketing variables and particularly of sales 
promotions on innovation adoption is limited, and thus we address this gap by 
examining the effect of a free trial on adoption. Second, we consider actual 
adoption behavior, which has been neglected in extant literature, though the 
link between intentions and behavior is especially uncertain for innovations. 
Third, the innovation adoption literature has mainly focused on products. We 
investigate an innovative contractual service, which is perceived as more risky 
than a product because it involves a long-term financial commitment. By focus-
ing on a contractual service, we need to account for a fixed consumption period 
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and usage behavior during this period rather than a fixed consumption amount 
(as for product sampling). Thus, we investigate (1) the effects of a free trial on 
(2) consumers’ actual adoption decision of (3) an innovative contractual ser-
vice. In what follows, we first summarize our main findings and then discuss 
the managerial implications. 
3.7.1. Main Findings 
Our findings imply that consumers highly value the chance to try a new service 
free of charge. Consumers prefer the free trial to both a paid trial and the regu-
lar paid offer. Both acquisition and transaction utility increase because costs 
are reduced. However, the fact that a free trial offers an “option premium” in 
that consumers can postpone the adoption decision does not add value. Con-
sumers seem to concentrate on the costs of the free trial as they receive the 
service free of charge for a limited time.  
 Furthermore, the results show that acceptance of a free trial increases the 
probability of adopting the paid offer afterward. In contrast with direct adop-
tion without prior trial, consumers do not need to pay setup costs after trial. In 
addition, the trial may trigger inertia effects, meaning that consumers simply 
continue the service because cancelling the contract requires taking action. 
Moreover, consumers may discover during the trial that they actually use the 
service more frequently than expected, which increases the perceived benefits. 
However, the free trial seems to suffer from negative reference price effects. In 
addition, the notion that consumers rely on their usage intensity to judge the 
value of the service may also backfire: Consumers who realize they use the 
service less frequently than expected may be less likely to adopt the paid offer, 
compared with the situation in which they did not accept the trial. However, for 
the net trial impact to become negative, the deviation of actual usage from ex-
pected usage must be strongly negative.  
3.7.2. Managerial Implications 
Contrary to the general belief that a free trial does not hurt unit sales, our anal-
ysis suggests that it may reduce the number of subscribers. This negative im-
pact is further reinforced by the data, which show that consumers who decide 
not to adopt after the trial do so for good.11 To avoid negative outcomes, man-
agers should control expectations of usage up front and keep track of usage 
levels during the free-trial period. To avoid large negative deviations of actual 
usage from expected usage, managers need to inform and teach consumers 
                                                                  
11 This permanent customer defection is not abnormal in a setting where, due to the opt-out clause, 
disadoption requires explicit – and therefore thought-through – action from the customer. 
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before they accept the trial through use of, for example, marketing communica-
tions that highlight the benefits of the service. They should also encourage cus-
tomers to use the service frequently by actively teaching them the benefits of 
the service and by eliminating malfunctions, especially during the free-trial 
period. Particularly in the introduction phase, innovative high-tech services 
may indeed show deficiencies.  
 In combination with the previously discussed finding that consumers do 
not value the opt-out opportunity, the negative effects at the end of the trial 
period suggest that managers should offer the first months of the regular con-
tract for free without giving consumers the chance to opt out. Doing so would 
avoid the negative post-trial effects: After the free period, all customers would 
become paying users.  
 To reduce the reference price effect, managers could also charge a modest 
amount for the trial. Although doing so would lower the initial attractiveness of 
the promotion, the less detrimental reference price effect may lead to a more 
favorable net impact. This is in line with Scott (1976), who finds that a free 
sample is not the most effective trial promotion to increase adoption: On the 
contrary, a sample for which consumers must pay a small amount seems more 
effective than a free sample.  
 Finally, managers should compare the effectiveness of their free trials with 
that of other marketing instruments. Direct contacts are important tools to 
increase adoption likelihood, even for newly introduced services (Prins and 
Verhoef 2007). Eventually, a firm can inform consumers with specific and fo-
cused messages. According to our findings, 10 contacts are needed before these 
marketing instruments increase adoption likelihood to the same degree as a 
free trial with an average usage level. We also find a positive impact of mass 
advertising, which creates awareness among consumers and proves important 
to spur the diffusion of innovative services. Yet a firm must spend approximate-
ly 10,000,000 € per month to influence adoption likelihood to the same extent 
as a free trial with average usage levels. In general, discounts also exert a posi-
tive influence on adoption likelihood, but they do not reach the same effective-
ness as a free trial. That is, the discount on a 12-month contract must be almost 
two and a half times as large as total costs of that contract. Thus, our data imply 
that, assuming average usage, the net feedback effect of a free trial on adoption 
likelihood is stronger than the impact of other marketing instruments, such as 
direct contacts, discounts, and mass advertising.  
 A trial promotion can be a successful tool to increase adoption likelihood, if 
actual and expected usage levels are carefully managed and controlled and if 
service malfunctions are prevented. The results also suggest that the effects of a 
trial promotion can be optimized, if negative reference price effects are mini-
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mized, by eventually charging customers a small amount and if the opt-out 
opportunity is eliminated.  
3.7.3. Limitations and Further Research  
This study has several limitations that lead to suggestions for further research. 
First, the data are restricted to one contractual innovative service, one industry, 
and one company. To test the generalizability of the findings, it would be valua-
ble to consider a wider range of services, industries, and/or companies.  
 Second, the trial period the focal company used lasted three months. Fur-
ther research on service trials could investigate different trial lengths to deter-
mine their effects on the adoption of innovations. For examples, it might be that 
for longer trial periods, the option premium becomes significant after all.  
 Third, we did not consider consumer learning during the free-trial period. 
However, incorporating usage-based learning about service quality would be a 
valuable extension to this research.  
 Fourth, further research could investigate whether customer behavior after 
the adoption decision differs depending on the acquisition method. Lewis 
(2006) reports that acquisition types influence customers’ lifetime values; for 
example, customers acquired with large discounts are less likely to repurchase. 
Consequently, future studies could examine the impact of free trials on con-
sumers’ lifetime value. 
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4.1. Introduction 
The two empirical studies of this dissertation investigate the effects of promo-
tions that involve a free offer, namely premium and free-trial promotions, on 
consumers‘ purchase behavior. The first study – Chapter 2 – studies the effects 
of premium promotions on consumers’ purchase decisions, incidence, choice, 
and quantity for fast-moving-consumer-goods, compares the premium effects 
with those of price cuts, and investigates three crucial moderators – namely the 
category’s degree of utilitarianism and hedonism, whether the promoted brand 
is a private label or a national brand, and the degree of premium-product relat-
edness – of this relationship. The second study – Chapter 3 – examines the im-
pact of free trials on consumers’ adoption of new contractual services. This 
chapter concludes this dissertation by discussing the findings and their practi-
cal implications, and giving suggestions for further research. 
4.2. Discussion 
This dissertation contributes to promotional literature by investigating the 
effectiveness of two promotions that involve a free offer. Although there exists 
research on the effectiveness of promotions that come with a free offer, we 
notice that there is ample room for further research. This is particularly true for 
premium promotions and free trials, whose effects we study in this disserta-
tion.  
 Research on the effects of premiums on consumers’ purchase decisions 
was limited to studies on choice, while effects on incidence and quantity had 
not been studied. However, extant research proposes that promotions perform 
differently across the different purchase levels (e.g. Foubert and Gijsbrechts 
2007). The analysis of Chapter 2 finds this to be true also for premium promo-
tions and indicates that the selection of promotions must be carefully matched 
with marketing goals. 
 The study on free-trial promotions contributes to promotional literature by 
investigating on the basis of panel data how a free service trial affects consum-
ers’ adoption decisions. Because a free trial enables consumers to use the ser-
vice freely during a consumption period, we include usage to understand its 
effect on a trial’s effectiveness. We also contribute to innovation adoption liter-
ature in that we are among the first to study a sales promotion’s effects on 
adoption of an innovative contractual service. The results of our study reveal 
that, although a free trial may lead to an increase in adoption likelihood, this is 
not always the case.  
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In the subsequent section, the findings and their managerial implications of the 
two empirical studies are discussed in detail.  
4.2.1. Premium Promotions 
Premiums have different effects across the three purchase levels. They exert 
positive effects on incidence and choice, but do not affect purchase quantity. 
Although the analysis reveals that price cuts in general perform better than 
premiums because of their strong effect on quantity, we find that there are 
moderators that can improve a premium’s performance relative to an equiva-
lent price cut. In particular, we examine three moderators - premium-product 
relatedness, national brand versus private label, and the product category’s 
degree of utilitarianism/hedonism. At the incidence and choice level, offering a 
premium with a private label rather than a national brand enhances a premium 
promotion’s relative effectiveness. This effect is intensified, if the brand belongs 
to a hedonic rather than to a utilitarian product category. This confirms the 
principle of benefit congruency (Chandon et al. 2000), which predicts that a 
promotion with hedonic benefits – a premium – performs better in hedonic 
than in utilitarian categories.  
 Interestingly, the expected moderating effect of premium-product related-
ness could not be confirmed. Eventually, consumers value the premium itself 
and consider the functional compatibility with the category to be rather unim-
portant. Furthermore, premiums that are attached to fast-moving consumer 
goods are usually simple items whose functionality is apparent even without a 
clear link with the category.  
 We conduct a simulation study, in which we take the promotions’ costs into 
account. Very often, price cuts cost manufacturers more than the final discount 
offered to consumers, whereas the premium’s cost may be significantly below 
the value perceived by consumers. Manufacturers pay more than the final dis-
count, because retailers keep a certain amount of the reduction, depending on 
the pass-through rate. We vary this rate to understand how the comparison of 
the two promotions is affected and find that premiums have the potential to 
outperform price cuts for hedonic brands and utilitarian private labels. Howev-
er, premiums should not be offered with utilitarian national brands.  
 This study illustrates that managers must understand promotional effects 
to align strategic objectives and promotional choice. Our analysis shows that 
premiums increase brand line sales (secondary demand) because they induce 
brand switching. For example, manufacturers, who aim at promoting a new 
product and are not interested in increasing total category sales, may consider 
a premium. However, premiums do not affect the quantity decision and are 
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therefore less appropriate if managers aim at increasing category sales among 
current buyers. Here, price cuts are the preferred alternative. 
4.2.2. Free Trial Promotions 
The results of the Multinomial Logit Model demonstrate that consumers highly 
value using a service free of charge: the fact that a free trial enables consumers 
to postpone their adoption decision has no influence on a trial’s attractiveness.  
The acceptance of the free trial has the potential to increase a consumer’s prob-
ability to accept the regular paid offer. Consumers, who have accepted the free 
trial, do not need to make any additional effort to adopt the regular offer after 
trial. Trial users who do not want to adopt the regular offer, must explicitly opt 
out after trial. This increases adoption likelihood because consumers may avoid 
the hassle of opting out (inertial effects). Another favorable effect is that con-
sumers may discover they use the service more frequently than expected, 
which leads to higher perceived benefits. However, a free trial may also trigger 
negative effects. Our results indicate that a free trial is subject to negative refer-
ence price effects. Also, some users may realize that they use the service far less 
frequently than expected, which leads to a decrease in adoption likelihood. 
However, for the net trial impact to become negative, the usage intensity should 
be much lower than expected.  
 Even when, on average, the free trial has a positive effect on adoption 
probability, a free trial may eventually hurt sales: as is common in a contractual 
context (and as suggested by our data), consumers that have decided not to 
adopt after a trial are very unlikely to consider adopting at a later moment and 
are thus lost for good. Managers must control consumers’ expectations and 
beliefs regarding their usage intensity before and during the free trial to avoid 
negative effects. A possible strategy is to inform consumers via marketing 
communication about the service’s benefits and continue to teach the function-
ality of the service during trial.  
4.3. Directions for Further Research 
We have reported several limitations and suggestions for further research for 
each empirical study. Here, we formulate some general suggestions.  
 Research on free should study long-term effects. Extant research finds that 
a customer’s behavior differs in the longer-term depending on the acquisition 
method. Lewis (2006) reports that acquisition types influence customers’ life-
time values: customers acquired via large discounts are less likely to repur-
chase. Thus, how will a free offer affect customers’ lifetime value and will they 
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repurchase in the future? Will the effects be visible only in the short, medium, 
or even long-term? The two promotions we examined in this dissertation may 
have different effects in the long-term. That is, a premium is conditional, be-
cause consumers need to purchase the underlying product in order to receive 
the premium. A free trial, however, is unconditional. This difference may cause 
free-trial promotions to be more susceptible to reference price changes, be-
cause the entire service can be unconditionally used for free. However, the 
conditional premium promotion may cause more reactance among consumers, 
because to receive the premium the product has to be bought or if the product 
is bought, the premium is an obligatory add on. Another intriguing question is 
whether the performance of free offers relative to price cuts improves once we 
also account for effects across time. For example, free offers deemphasize the 
product’s price (Darke and Chung 2005) and might thus have a less detrimental 
effect on consumers’ reference prices than price cuts do (Lattin and Bucklin 
1989). 
 In Chapter 2 we compare premiums and price cuts to identify situations in 
which one outperforms the other. However, for premium promotions, bonus 
packs, samples, and free trials alike, further research should compare free of-
fers with other promotions that do not involve a free offer. Although several 
authors have compared different sales promotions (e.g. Arora and Henderson 
2007; Kumar and Leone 1988), systematic comparisons at different purchase 
levels have still not been conducted for the majority of sales promotions.  
 Similarly, promotions that involve a free offer should be compared to each 
other. Although free triggers some general mechanisms, the effects of the free 
offers seem to also depend on the characteristics of the free offer. Thus, it is 
particularly interesting to understand how the specific characteristics of the 
free offers influence the promotions’ effects. 
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Appendix Pre-Purchase Questionnaire 
1.  Socio-Demographic Information 
 Question Answer Possibilities Purpose 
1. Who is mainly responsible for grocery 
shopping in your family? 
I am responsible. 
My partner is responsible. 
My partner and I are both responsi-
ble. 
Somebody else is responsible. 
Selection of 
Sample 
2. Do you or another member of your family 
regularly consume milk/orange 
juice/margarine/cereals? 
Yes 
No 
Selection of 
categories to 
purchase in 
3. What is your gender? Male 
Female 
Control 
4. What is your age? 18 years or younger 
19–25 years 
26–35 years 
36–45 years 
46–55 years 
56–65 years 
66 years or older 
Control 
5. How can your family situation best be 
described? 
Living with parents 
Living alone 
Widowed 
Married 
Living together with unmarried 
partner 
Divorced 
Other 
Control 
6. How many children do you have that still 
live at home? (Please indicate the number 
of children of a certain age group in the 
boxes.) 
None 
Younger than 3 years  
Between 3 and 6 years 
Between 7 and 14 years 
Between 15 and 18 years 
Older than 18 years 
Control 
7. What is your highest attained diploma? Elementary school 
Lower secondary school 
Higher secondary school 
College, short type 
College, long type 
University 
Other 
Control 
8. What is your work situation? Student 
Homemaker 
Part-time employed 
Full-time employed 
Work seeking 
Retired 
Other 
Control 
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2. Usual Shopping Behavior 
 Question Answer Possibilities Purpose 
1. How often do you buy on average in 
this category? 
Less than once a weeka 
More than once a weekb 
Purchase frequency 
(FREQ) 
2. How many weeks are between two 
shopping trips in this category? 
 
3. How often per week do you buy on 
average in this category? 
 
4. If you buy, how many packages do you 
purchase? 
 Indicated purchase 
quantity 
5. Please indicate which products you 
have bought during the last 12 months. 
If the product you usually purchase is 
not listed, please fill in the box at the 
end.  
[A list of products in the 
category including name and 
a picture] 
Loyalty indicator (LOY) 
6. Please indicate how often you purchase 
the under 5. selected products. If you 
purchase e.g. three different products, 
please indicate their shares. For exam-
ple: 
Milk 1:70% 
Milk 2:20% 
Milk 3:10%  
 
a If a consumer buys less than once a week, go to 2, skip 3, and continue directly with 4. 
b If a consumer buys more than once a week, go directly to 3.  
3. Consumption Behavior 
 Question Answer Possibilities Purpose 
1. Which product size do you usually 
purchase? 
Normal sizesa  
Big sizesa 
Calculation of usual 
consumption for the 
inventory calculation 2. How many packages do you and your 
family consume per week? 
Less than one unit per weekb
More than one unit per weekc
3. How many weeks do you do on average 
with one package? 
4. How many packages do you consume 
on average per week? 
 
5. How many open packages do you have 
at home at the moment? 
 Current inventory at the 
beginning of the shop-
ping experiment 6. How many closed packages do you 
have at home at the moment? 
 
a In the questionnaire, to clarify normal and large, sizes, depending on the category, are in either 
grams or liters.  
b If a consumer consumes less than one unit per week, go to 3, skip 4, and continue with 5. 
 c If a consumer consumes more than one unit per week, continue with 4. 
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